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TRANSFORMING THE MEANS AND ENDS OF
NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT*
ALEJANDRO E. CAMACHO**
This Article considers how prominent goals of natural resources law and
the prevailing model of regulatory decision making combine to limit the
capacity of natural resources governance to manage the effects of climate
change. The Article explores the implications of continuing to rely on
conventionally static and fragmented decision making, passive
management, and historical preservation when global climatic shifts are
widely expected to lead to rapid changes in ecological systems that are
unforeseen, novel, and potentially detrimental to ecological diversity and
function. This emphasis of natural resources management on stasis arises
from the legal system’s discomfort with integrating and managing
uncertainty and change. As an accelerant, climate change makes this
rigidity particularly evident and unsustainable. The Article ultimately
argues for the need to change both the means and the ends of natural
resources law to better deal with change and uncertainty, as well as inform
and galvanize public deliberation on natural resource decisions.
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Existing natural resources law in the United States is poorly suited to
foster effective human and ecological adaptation1 to the effects of climate
change on natural resources for two reasons—one procedural, the other
substantive. First, natural resource decision-making processes exhibit poor
adaptive capacity because they are not designed to incentivize intra-agency
learning or to make use of existing opportunities for interjurisdictional
learning.2 As uncertainty is one of the largest threats to natural resources
management arising from global climate change, most natural resources
management authorities lack sufficient capacity to engage in meaningful
climate change adaptation planning.
Second, key preservationist goals of natural resources law premised
on historical preservation (the protection of resources or landscapes in
their historical condition) or passive management (minimizing human
1. Unlike climate change mitigation strategies, which focus on how to minimize or regulate
greenhouse gas air emissions to prevent or reduce further climate change, climate change
adaptation strategies concentrate on how to manage and reduce the detrimental climate change-
related effects on natural and human systems. See WILLIAM E. EASTERLING III ET AL., PEW CTR.
ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, COPING WITH GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: THE ROLE OF
ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, at iii (2004), available at
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Adaptation.pdf; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, Appendix I: Glossary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND
VULNERABILITY, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 869, 869 (Martin Parry et al. eds.,
2007) [hereinafter IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY]. As a result, they are
fundamentally different, but possibly complementary, enterprises. See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2009),
available at http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf
(“Mitigation and adaptation are both essential parts of a comprehensive climate change response
strategy.”).
2. See infra Part I.
CAMACHO.BKI 6/13/2011 1:55 PM
2011] NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1407
involvement with nonhuman systems) will be increasingly costly, difficult,
and even impossible to meet.3 As the most prominent federal example of
historical preservation, the National Parks Organic Act tethers the national
park system to a historical baseline with its central purpose of maintaining
“the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein
. . . unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”4 The fundamental
mandate of the Wilderness Act, the primary federal example of passive
management, is the protection of areas “where the earth and its community
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain.”5 By exerting increased stress on already taxed ecosystems and
causing or accelerating fundamental ecological changes from prior
conditions, climate change makes the significant costs and ultimate
unsuitability of the National Parks Organic Act’s historical preservation
and the Wilderness Act’s passive management goals particularly evident.
Because it pits historical preservation and passive management goals
against each other, and potentially against concerns for long-term
ecological function, climate change makes profound modification in natural
resources law essential.
The procedural and substantive limitations of natural resources law are
interrelated, as are the solutions to those limitations. Natural resources law
in the United States has traditionally emphasized static models of nature (to
what end should we manage natural systems) and of decision making (how
we learn and decide). The reliance of natural resources management on
static decision making on the one hand, and passive management and
historical preservation on the other, depend on and reinforce each other.
This emphasis on stasis arises from the legal system’s traditional
discomfort with integrating and managing uncertainty and change. To
address this, both the means and ends of natural resources law and
management must be refashioned to better adapt to a dynamic world. This
includes an increased emphasis not on preserving the past or minimizing
human involvement, but rather on limiting bad interactions and promoting
the function of valuable ecological processes and constituents. Because this
substantive vision of natural resources management is less expert-driven
and scientific, it also emphasizes that natural resources law’s core function
should be improving the process of natural resource decision making. This
includes a regulatory process premised on promoting stakeholder
involvement, cultivating agency and stakeholder learning, and reducing
uncertainty over time. In addition, the adaptive governance process
3. See infra Part II.
4. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
5. Id. § 1131(c).
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recognizes that resource management decisions, such as whether or not to
introduce a species into an area outside of its preexisting range, at their
core are not only technical, but in fact fundamentally normative or political.
This Article explores the relationship between these embedded models
of nature and decision making, and how these assumptions limit the
capacity of existing regulatory systems to manage the effects of climate
change on natural resources in the United States. Part I explores how
existing regulatory institutions are poorly suited to foster effective natural
resource adaptation because they are not designed to cultivate systematic
learning and manage uncertainty. Part II explores the static view of nature
enshrined in particular substantive goals of natural resources law. In this
context, it considers the implications of the conservation movement’s
emphasis on historical preservation. Part III discusses the link between
these two static visions, how they are mutually reinforcing, and how the
solutions to their shortcomings are connected as well. Part IV professes the
need to change both the means and the ends of natural resources law to
better deal with change and uncertainty as well as inform and galvanize
public deliberation on natural resource decisions.
I. THE WEAK ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF NATURAL RESOURCE PROCESSES
The biggest threat to natural resources management that accompanies
climate change is information uncertainty. Unfortunately, existing
government institutions for managing natural resources are not sufficiently
designed to encourage the reduction and management of uncertainty.6
Moreover, the current natural resources regulatory system fails to take
advantage of the significant opportunities for interjurisdictional learning
that exist.7 As a result, the existing framework for managing natural
resources in the United States lacks adequate capacity to develop effective
strategies for preparing for and weathering the current and future effects of
climate change.
A. Climate Change Adaptation and Uncertainty
Uncertainty is prevalent in environmental governance. In fact, some
scholars consider uncertainty to be a defining characteristic of
environmental problems.8 However, the uncertainty accompanying climate
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 15
(3d ed. 2010) (“In many respects scientific uncertainty is the defining feature of environmental
policy.”); Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the Precautionary Principle, 108 COLUM. L. REV.
494, 498–99 (2008); Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207, 208 (1978) (“Ignorance of mechanism is the first characteristic of
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change adaptation is of a different order of magnitude than conventional
environmental problems.
As alarming as the current and projected consequences from
anthropogenic climate change are, the primary concern of natural resources
law over the next several decades should not be the direct ecological effects
from climate change. There is considerable reliable evidence that climate
change is having (and will increasingly have) substantial negative effects
on ecological systems and processes. Extensive scientific data indicates
that climate change has caused significant harm to wildlife, vegetation, and
ecological processes,9 including biota in the United States.10 The effects on
environmental risk problems.”) (emphasis omitted).
9. See, e.g., CAMILLE PARMESAN & HECTOR GALBRAITH, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, OBSERVED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. 17–34 (2004), available at
www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/final_ObsImpact.pdf (reporting the effects of climate change in
the United States); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, in
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 2–5 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS]
(listing the human drivers of climate change); Camille Parmesan, Ecological and Evolutionary
Responses to Recent Climate Change, 37 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS
637, 639 (2006) (“[T]he direct impacts of anthropogenic climate change have been documented
on every continent, in every ocean, and in most major taxonomic groups.”) (citations omitted);
Camille Parmesan & Gary Yohe, A Globally Coherent Fingerprint of Climate Change Impacts
Across Natural Systems, 421 NATURE 37, 41 (2003) (discussing the substantial detrimental
effects of climate change); Martin L. Parry et al., Summary for Policymakers, in IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY, supra note 1, at 7, 8–9 (listing observed impacts of climate
change on the natural and human environment); Boris Worm et al., Impacts of Biodiversity Loss
on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 SCIENCE 787, 787–90 (2006) (discussing the effect of aquatic
biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystems).
10. See, e.g., CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INDICATORS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN
CALIFORNIA, at ii–iii, 146–65 (Linda Mazur & Carmen Milanes eds., 2009), available at
http://www.oehha.ca.gov/multimedia/epic/pdf/ClimateChangeIndicatorsApril2009.pdf (reporting
decreased spring snowmelt, rising sea levels, increased frequency of wildfires, accelerated wine
grape blooming, and changes in bird, small mammal, and butterfly migration patterns in
California); THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CTR. FOR SCI., ECON. & THE ENV’T, THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS 2008: FOCUS ON CLIMATE CHANGE 2–4 (2008), available at
http://www.heinzctr.org/ecosystems/2008report/pdf_files/ Climate_Fact_Sheet.pdf (summarizing
indicators of climate change in the United States); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
supra note 1, at 27–40 (describing climate change in the United States); Peter Backlund et al.,
Executive Summary, in THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE ON AGRICULTURE, LAND
RESOURCES, WATER RESOURCES, AND BIODIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT BY THE
U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL CHANGE
RESEARCH 1, 4–5 (Margaret Walsh ed., 2008) [hereinafter THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE],
available at http://www.sap43.ucar.edu/documents/SAP_4.3_6.18.pdf (exploring how changes in
climate exacerbate or ameliorate stresses on agriculture, land resources, water resources, and
biodiversity); Lisa Crozier, Warmer Winters Drive Butterfly Range Expansion by Increasing
Survivorship, 85 ECOLOGY 231, 239–40 (2004) (explaining the northward movement of the
sachem skipper butterfly range); Alan T. Hitch & Paul L. Leberg, Breeding Distributions of
North American Bird Species Moving North as a Result of Climate Change, 21 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 534, 534 (2007) (“As predicted, the northern limit of birds with a southern distribution
CAMACHO.BKI 6/13/2011 1:55 PM
1410 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
ecological and human systems from projected future climate change are
expected to be substantially greater, with particular harm in the United
States to forest, coastal, and freshwater resources.11
Nonetheless, the exceptional uncertainty that exists for natural
resource adaptation efforts will likely be at least as significant a barrier to
functional management of the effects of climate change on natural systems
as these direct ecological effects themselves. The projected breadth,
severity, and speed of climate change threaten to move many vital and
productive ecosystems outside their range of historical variability.12
Unfortunately, this unprecedented change not only jeopardizes the
fundamental resilience, and thus existence of, these ecosystems,13 but also
makes extrapolations from current ecological knowledge of limited value.
Furthermore, the global scale of the problem, the inevitably limited study
of the effects of climate change,14 and the complex interaction between a
host of climatic variables15 raise considerable uncertainty for the
showed a significant shift northward (2.35 km/year).”); David W. Inouye et al., Climate Change
Is Affecting Altitudinal Migrants and Hibernating Species, 97 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1630,
1632–33 (2000); Parmesan, supra note 9, at 643–44 (noting the acceleration in bloom dates
(phytoplankton), flowering dates (flowers), calling dates (frogs), and spring events (birds) for
certain species); Monika Winder & Daniel E. Schindler, Climate Change Uncouples Trophic
Interactions in an Aquatic Ecosystem, 85 ECOLOGY 2100, 2102–05 (2004).
11. See PETER C. FRUMHOFF ET AL., THE NORTHEAST CLIMATE IMPACTS ASSESSMENT,
CONFRONTING CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE U.S. NORTHEAST: SCIENCE, IMPACTS, AND SOLUTIONS
47 (2007), available at http://www.climatechoices.org/assets/
documents/climatechoices/confronting-climate-change-in-the-u-s-northeast.pdf; David M.
Lawrence et al., Accelerated Arctic Land Warming and Permafrost Degradation During Rapid
Sea Ice Loss, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS L11506, at 5 (2008); Parry et al., supra note 9, at
10–12 (projecting with very high confidence increased harm to coastal and freshwater resources);
M.G. Ryan et al., Land Resources: Forests and Arid Lands, in THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, supra note 10, at 75, 96–103 (projecting greater disturbance to forests from fire,
pestilence, and disease).
12. See, e.g., Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11 (“The resilience of many ecosystems is likely to
be exceeded this century.”); Frank J. Rahel et al., Managing Aquatic Species of Conservation
Concern in the Face of Climate Change and Invasive Species, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 551,
557 (2008) (“Climate changes . . . may cause environmental conditions to exceed the historic
range of variability to which species are adapted in a particular region.”).
13. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11; Stephen H. Schneider et al., Climate-Change
Scenarios for Impact Assessment, in GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 38, 53
(Robert L. Peters & Thomas L. Lovejoy eds., 1992).
14. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 9 (“[A]vailable analyses are limited in the number of
systems and locations considered.”).
15. A number of features of climate dynamics remain difficult to predict and/or poorly
understood. Some features, such as melting permafrost, may lead to a vicious cycle of warming,
but the extent of these nonlinear effects is unclear. See Katey M. Walter et al., Methane Bubbling
from Northern Lakes: Present and Future Contributions to the Global Methane Budget, 365
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 1657, 1671 (2007). Similarly, the influence of potentially
confounding natural factors is unclear. See Richard A. Kerr, Another Global Warming Icon
Comes Under Attack, 317 SCIENCE 28, 28 (2007) (considering how emitted aerosols may
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development of effective climate change mitigation and adaptation
strategies.16
Yet climate change adaptation efforts face even greater uncertainty
than mitigation strategies. As compared to scientific models of global
climate temperatures and sea levels for developing mitigation strategies,
modeling for adaptation decisions requires the additional step of
“downscaling,” which takes global models and attempts to project how
such changes in global temperature will affect local conditions and
resources.17 For example, to project the effects of climate change on a
particular species, accurate models would need to input (often nonexistent)
data on the existing range and dispersal characteristics of that species and
other ecologically linked species, and forecast how local climatic changes
might shift such ranges when combined with other dispersal barriers. Of
course, the localized impacts of climate change will vary greatly depending
on the adaptability of each ecosystem18 and many local nonclimate factors,
such as population shifts and income, existing land uses, technological
development, and invasive species.19 Many additional assumptions beyond
those for global modeling are necessary, and small changes in these
assumptions can lead to widely varying results.20 Consequently, localized
modeling of the effects of climate change remains much more inchoate and
less reliable than the modeling used to inform decisions on mitigation.21 Of
counteract warming by deflecting solar radiation); J. T. Randerson et al., The Impact of Boreal
Forest Fire on Climate Warming, 314 SCIENCE 1130, 1130 (2006) (discussing evidence that
increased forest fires may reduce temperatures in the long term because of increased surface
reflectivity). In addition, some climatic features will likely be discovered only after additional
climatic changes occur. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building
Bridges to the No-Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 19 (2008) (“[E]ven as we learn more about
the highly coupled, tightly interacting processes that comprise the climate, the likelihood is that
we will realize with even greater clarity that it is inherently unpredictable.”).
16. See Ruhl, supra note 15, at 22 (“[C]limate change does not present just another
disturbance regime, the operations of which we can extrapolate from current ecological
knowledge; rather, it will be the undoing of ecosystems as we know them.”); Joseph A. Siegel,
Collaborative Decision Making on Climate Change in the Federal Government, 27 PACE ENVTL.
L. REV. 257, 259 (2009).
17. See Climate and Land Use Change Effects on Ecological Resources in Three
Watersheds: A Synthesis Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,045, 45,046 (Aug. 10, 2007) (notice of public
comment).
18. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11.
19. See id. at 20.
20. See, e.g., DAVID C. BADER ET AL., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM & THE
SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, CLIMATE MODELS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 88 (2008), available at www.sc.doe.gov/ober/sap3-1-final-all.pdf
(“[M]aking different assumptions about the land biosphere within a single model gave markedly
different feedback values.”).
21. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 9 (“[T]emperature variability is larger at the regional
than at the global scale . . . . [A]t the regional scale other factors (such as land-use change,
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course, such uncertainty is amplified by the fact that the effects of global
climate change on ecosystems will be influenced by two other factors for
which there remains limited information: the extent of mitigation strategies
to be employed to abate further climatic change22 and the collateral effects
on biota from adaptation strategies likely to be adopted to protect human-
dominated landscapes.23
Together these factors elevate uncertainty to an unprecedented level,24
forcing scientists to reexamine or even discard conventional assumptions
and methods, and making regulators assess and manage problems they have
never faced before. In this uncertain regulatory environment, natural
resources governance must be primarily concerned with maximizing
natural resources institutions’ capacity to assess, manage, and reduce
uncertainty where possible. Accordingly, though the development of
substantive strategies for adapting natural and human systems to the
physical effects of climate change will be vital, some of the most important
strategies to facilitate effective adaptation to the effects of climate change
will be those that encourage regulators and stakeholders to manage
uncertainty through learning. This includes generating and gathering
information about current and projected effects and past, existing, and
potential future management strategies, as well as promoting the
integration of such information throughout the regulatory and resource
management process.
B. Existing Governance Hinders Effective Management of Uncertainty
Unfortunately, the natural resources governance system in the United
States is poorly suited to foster effective natural resource adaptation
because it is not designed to foster learning. This is due to two basic
features. First, most natural resource programs do not sufficiently
encourage managers and regulators to learn, manage uncertainty, or make
management more effective at achieving regulatory goals. Second, natural
resources governance is generally characterized by fragmented and largely
uncoordinated authority that is limited in its capacity to promote
interjurisdictional information sharing and collaboration that can help
pollution, and invasive species) are influential.”); Susan Solomon et al., Technical Summary, in
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 9, at 19, 74 boxTS.10 (“There remain a number of
important sources of uncertainty limiting the ability to project regional climate change.”).
22. See EASTERLING ET AL., supra note 1, at iii.
23. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 9, at 3–4; Ruhl, supra note
15, at 24–26 (explaining the secondary ecological and human adaptation effects of climate
change); Solomon et al., supra note 21, at 42–43.
24. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing
Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 14–15 (2009); Siegel, supra
note 16, at 266.
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reduce uncertainty about both the efficacy of management strategies and
the effects of climate change. Because it lacks a sufficient infrastructure for
cultivating learning and information sharing, the current federal system of
natural resources management has and will continue to have considerable
difficulty managing and reducing uncertainty.
1. Front-end, Static Government Decision Making
Most American natural resource programs are not designed to manage
uncertainty or reduce mistakes that are almost certain to occur when facing
unclear regulatory problems. Natural resources law fails to encourage
resource managers to systematically monitor25 and adjust management
decisions to make them more effective at achieving program goals.26 Even
for more conventional environmental problems, agencies inevitably have
limited information about the relevant environment and effects of proposed
actions. In this context, agencies regularly adopt strategies that subsequent
data may demonstrate are insufficient or for which background conditions
shift such that the strategy is no longer as effective as previously
expected.27
However, agencies are not required or encouraged to monitor past
decisions, adjust such decisions to reflect new information or changed
circumstances, or be more effective over time at achieving regulatory
goals. Though statutes and regulations routinely require post-decision
monitoring, and while agencies expressly acknowledge the importance of
accountability,28 agency attention to such directives is notoriously
deficient.29 Agencies rarely even assess whether prior background
25. See Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 32–34) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(highlighting numerous obstacles, both internal and external, that agencies face in the
development of monitoring programs).
26. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 64.
27. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity,
and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 201 (2002).
28. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive
Management, 55 UCLA L. REV. 293, 324–25 (2007).
29. See MGMT. SYS. INT’L, AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE’S NATIONAL WILDLIFE REFUGE SYSTEM 20 (2008), available
at http://www.fws.gov/refuges/policiesandbudget/independentEval.html (“[O]nly 11% of refuge
managers surveyed described the current level of inventory and monitoring work as being mostly
or fully sufficient.”); Biber, supra note 25 (manuscript at 40–49) (detailing substantial agency
incentives to not carry out ambient monitoring); Camacho, supra note 28, at 324–28; Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 28–29
(1997).
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assumptions were accurate or whether prior decisions are actually
achieving regulatory goals.30
Moreover, statutes and regulations do not require most agencies to
work with and reduce uncertainty by adjusting adopted strategies over
time.31 In most instances, virtually all agency attention and resources are
directed at the initial decision, regardless of how little information there is
to make the decision.32 Once an initial decision is made, whether regarding
an individual project or an entire program, the agency rarely revisits it in
any systematic way to adjust the decision or learn from its successes or
limitations for future actions.33 In this sense, natural resource decision
making reflects a static, front-end approach to resource regulation and
management.
Many scholars in the legal and scientific literature have called for the
use of “adaptive management” protocols that seek to account for new
information or changes in circumstances through persistent monitoring,
assessment, and adjustment of resource management decisions.34
Concurrently, a growing number of natural resource agencies have adopted
these experimental strategies.35 Adaptive management was developed
precisely to help resource managers deal with uncertainty in the regulatory
process.36 Ideally, through adaptive management government officials can
30. Camacho, supra note 28, at 332–35.
31. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 37–38; Freeman, supra note 29, at 16–17.
32. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 38; Camacho, supra note 28, at 324; Karkkainen, supra
note 27, at 200–01.
33. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 38; Camacho, supra note 28, at 324.
34. For scientific literature, see, for example, GEORGE H. STANKEY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES: THEORY, CONCEPTS, AND
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTIONS 31–33 (2005), available at
www.fs.fed.us/pnw/pubs/pnw_gtr654.pdf; CARL WALTERS, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF
RENEWABLE RESOURCES 257 (1986); C.S. Holling, The Spruce Budworm/Forest-Management
Problem, in ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 143, 156 (C.S.
Holling ed., 1978). For legal scholarship encouraging integration of ongoing monitoring and
adaptation in regulation, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf & Charles E. Sabel, A Constitution of
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 285 (1998); Freeman, supra note 29, at
28–29; Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 496 (2004).
35. See, e.g., Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,252
(June 1, 2000) (detailing U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration guidance requiring adaptive management strategies under the Endangered Species
Act for certain habitat conservation plans (“HCPs”)). See generally BYRON K. WILLIAMS ET AL.,
ADAPTIVE MGMT. WORKING GRP., ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT: THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR TECHNICAL GUIDE (2009), available at
http://www.doi.gov/initiatives/AdaptiveManagement/TechGuide/opening pgs.pdf (adopting
policy guidance for the Department of the Interior seeking incorporation of adaptive management
“into pertinent internal programmatic guidance” to be considered for use in certain situations).
36. WALTERS, supra note 34, at 257; Camacho, supra note 24, at 23; Holling, supra note 34,
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act using the limited data they initially possess (rather than wait to act until
such data is certain) with the knowledge that the strategy can be changed
later as more information becomes available or conditions change.37
Adaptive management can also be employed to assess background
assumptions such as a reliance on historical conditions as a baseline for
projecting future trends.38 As a result, scholars and agencies increasingly
endorse the incorporation of adaptive management to cope with the
uncertainty likely to arise with climate change.39
Nonetheless, to date most attempts to use adaptive management fail to
require or encourage resource managers to learn from their management
decisions.40 Many such adaptive management experiments have failed to
provide agency officials with significant resources or other incentives to
implement monitoring and adaptive management.41 A number of adaptive
management programs have failed to provide clear objectives for
experiments to be assessed against, or specific criteria or triggers for when
strategies must be adjusted to reflect new information or changed
circumstances.42 Monitoring of past decisions is usually required, but often
deficient.43 Even programs that claim to promote the use of adaptive
management rarely require it, and when adaptive management is
at 156.
37. See Joseph Arvai et al., Adaptive Management of the Global Climate Problem: Bridging
the Gap Between Climate Research and Climate Policy, 78 CLIMATIC CHANGE 217, 219 (2006).
38. See Linda A. Joyce et al., National Forests, in PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF ADAPTATION
OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 19, 47 (Susan Herrod Julius &
Jordan M. West eds., 2008) [hereinafter ADAPTATION OPTIONS], available at
http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap4-4/sap4-4-final-report-all.pdf.
39. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RISING TO THE URGENT CHALLENGE: STRATEGIC
PLAN FOR RESPONDING TO ACCELERATING CLIMATE CHANGE 15–17 (2010), available at
http://www.fws.gov/home/climatechange/pdf/CCStrategicPlan.pdf (incorporating adaptive
management into a framework for addressing climate change); J. Michael Scott et al., National
Wildlife Refuges, in ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 38, at ch. 5, 37; Emma L. Tompkins &
W. Neil Adger, Does Adaptive Management of Natural Resources Enhance Resilience to Climate
Change?, ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (Dec. 2004),
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art10/main.html.
40. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 40–42, 47–48 (noting, among other examples, that
“USFWS does not systematically collect or assess information about HCPs to allow or direct
agency personnel to learn about the relative value of different negotiating, monitoring, and
management strategies”).
41. See R. Gregory et al., Deconstructing Adaptive Management: Criteria for Applications
to Environmental Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2411, 2413 (2006) (noting that a
lack of institutional support can make applying adaptive management very difficult); Scott et al.,
supra note 39, at 29.
42. See Dave Owen, Law, Environmental Dynamism, Reliability: The Rise and Fall of
CALFED, 37 ENVTL. L. 1145, 1199 (2007); Lawrence Susskind et al., Collaborative Planning
and Adaptive Management in Glen Canyon: A Cautionary Tale, 35 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 35–
38 (2010).
43. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 324–28.
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incorporated into an initial regulatory decision actual subsequent
adjustment of that strategy is even less common.44
Perhaps more important than gathering and integrating information
about background conditions and the actual environmental effects of
adopted strategies, these regulatory programs do not require the collection
and assimilation of information about the efficacy of adopted regulatory
strategies, program processes, or the agency as a whole at achieving the
program’s goals.45 They do not systematically direct or otherwise urge
agency officials to learn about the relative value of different management
strategies46 or provide such officials ready access to the experience of
similarly situated officials in the same or other agencies.47 As a
consequence, conventional regulatory programs and existing regulatory
experiments typically do not systematically gather information about the
performance of previously adopted strategies or assess whether such
strategies or programs have been effective at achieving stated goals.48
In essence, existing natural resources law has failed to establish any
systemic capacity to manage or reduce uncertainty through learning. The
absence of a framework for gathering and using information pertinent to
the regulatory process results in weak agency accountability, as not only
the agency but also Congress, stakeholders, and the public have limited
credible information to use to promote changes that make management
strategies more effective.49 More significantly in the context of climate
change, this lack of information about management practices compounds
the substantial uncertainty that agencies confront in managing natural
systems that are changing in unpredictable ways. Natural resources law
needs to develop a comprehensive framework that encourages agencies to
manage and reduce uncertainty about changing natural systems and the
regulatory programs that they employ.
44. See id. at 332–35; Owen, supra note 42, at 1199, 1204 (indicating that though CALFED
purported to use adaptive management practices and was deemed exemplary at its outset, it failed
to sustain enduring adaptive management).
45. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Beyond Conjecture: Learning About Ecosystem
Management from the Glen Canyon Dam Experiment, 8 NEV. L.J. 942, 955–56 (2008).
46. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 29; Camacho, supra note 28, at 336–42; Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental
Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1442 (2008) (stating that inadequate information about
environmental conditions, regulatory strategies, and agency performance has contributed to the
failure of certain regulatory experiments).
47. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 28, at 341; Karkkainen, supra note 34, at 495
(“[R]esponsibility for negotiating HCPs and enforcing their terms was a responsibility assigned to
regional and field offices, each operating largely by its own lights.”).
48. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 341.
49. See Camacho, supra note 45, at 957.
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2. Fragmentation and Intergovernmental Information Sharing
Existing regulatory fragmentation (with, at best, weak coordination
among authorities) also hinders agency adaptation and fails to promote
inter-jurisdictional information sharing that can promote learning and help
regulatory authorities manage uncertainty. Natural systems in the United
States are generally subject to a patchwork of piecemeal and overlapping
management, divided based, among other things, on (1) the protected
resource or resource feature, (2) the level of government, (3) the branch of
government, and (4) the regulatory stage.50 The existing natural resources
management system in the United States was not designed with climate
change in mind, or for landscape-wide shifts in climate across jurisdictional
boundaries. Rather, it was designed under the paradigm of allowing a wide
range of different regulatory authorities to each manage a set of narrow and
discrete, but often overlapping, resource problems.51
Though such decentralized regulatory authority allows for the
possibility of innovation and inter-jurisdictional learning,52 currently
regulatory authorities neither have the incentives nor genuine opportunities
to learn from other similarly situated resource managers. Not only do such
authorities lack relevant information, they also lack the capacity to obtain
such information. The absence of such an information infrastructure is a
recipe for disaster with the onset of global climate change, which is likely
to increase the possibility of resource scarcity and conflict, the interaction
of jurisdictions, and the potential for regulatory overlap between regulatory
authorities.
a. Fragmentation and Climate Change
Existing fragmented governance inhibits not only agency action
addressing the effects of climate change but also the capacity for inter-
jurisdictional learning that can help reduce uncertainty. Other scholars have
detailed how agency inaction can be a detrimental consequence of
regulatory fragmentation for large-scale, diffuse resource issues.53 Climate
change adaptation serves as a good example of such a “regulatory
50. See William W. Buzbee, The Regulatory Fragmentation Continuum, Westway and The
Challenges of Regional Growth, 21 J.L. & POL. 323, 342–48 (2005).
51. See generally Camacho, supra note 24 (discussing regulatory fragmentation in natural
resources governance).
52. See infra notes 78–82 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive
Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 61–64
(2010) (discussing agencies’ reticence to take on complex problems that cannot be adequately
addressed under the jurisdiction of a single agency).
CAMACHO.BKI 6/13/2011 1:55 PM
1418 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
commons.”54 Though climate change’s causes and effects are well
recognized, they extend across a wide number and range of jurisdictions.55
As a result of their limited jurisdiction, most agencies with regulatory
authority over natural resources have little incentive to engage in
adaptation planning and management activities or even to develop the
capacity to do so.56
In addition, uncoordinated fragmentation severely limits the capacity
for agency learning, further exacerbating the enormous uncertainty
agencies face from climate change. In the current U.S. natural resources
management system, regulators and managers do not have the ability to tap
into and learn readily from the strategies or analyses developed by other
agency divisions or agencies (in part because such data is not generated and
in part because it is not broadly accessible).57 This lack of information
about the efficacy of potential management strategies combines with the
limited data on the localized effects of climate change to make many
government authorities conclude that they lack the capacity to engage in
productive adaptation planning.58
Unfortunately, agency officials often choose to focus their energy on
more immediate, well-defined concerns than the more nebulous and
difficult problems of climate change.59 Numerous government reports have
conceded that the United States is unprepared to manage the effects of
climate change.60 Though some resource agencies are planning and even
54. William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory
Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13–14, 23 (2003).
55. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water
Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 828–31, 861 (2008).
56. See Buzbee, supra note 54, at 30–36 (discussing the high information costs, status quo
biases, limited agency credit for being proactive, and the risk aversion of regulators in a
fragmented regulatory setting); Camacho, supra note 24, at 27–28 (suggesting these conditions
exist for adaptation planning).
57. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 28, at 341 (“[T]here is no comprehensive network to
facilitate the dissemination of . . . information in other than a haphazard, and likely inefficient,
way. . . . [N]egotiation and implementation are conducted by regional and field offices without
any centralized or even decentralized coordination. Moreover, the high turnover of [U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service] staff exacerbates this fragmentation problem by further limiting the ability to
draw on prior experience. As such, there is, at best, limited cross-pollination of data . . . and
certainly far less than could occur.”) (footnotes omitted); Karkkainen, supra note 34, at 495.
58. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-863, CLIMATE CHANGE:
AGENCIES SHOULD DEVELOP GUIDANCE FOR ADDRESSING THE EFFECTS ON FEDERAL LAND
AND WATER RESOURCES 155–67 (2007) [hereinafter GAO REPORT 2007], available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d07863.pdf (conveying comments by various officials regarding their
agencies’ limited capacity to respond to climate change); Peter Kareiva et al., Synthesis and
Conclusions, in ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 38, at ch. 9, 30–31 (discussing opportunities
to positively address climate change based on “management policies and procedures”).
59. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 29.
60. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-113, CLIMATE CHANGE
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rolling out adaptation plans,61 such activities are still limited in
development, number, and scope.62 Today, very few natural resources
management activities consider the effects of climate change, and those
that do generally concentrate on proposing additional research or
information gathering.63
b. Problems with Centralization Proposals
One solution commonly offered to address the incentives toward
inaction caused by regulatory fragmentation is the consolidation of
decision-making authority in fewer and/or more central institutions.64 A
centralization strategy might provide for oversight or substantive review of
an agency’s activities by a more centralized regulator or for the limited
consolidation of a few programs.65 More extensive consolidation strategies
might include federal preemption of state authority or a comprehensive
reallocation or restructuring of management responsibility.66 Two examples
of more fundamental consolidation include proposals to integrate federal
intelligence gathering and the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security.67
ADAPTATION: STRATEGIC FEDERAL PLANNING COULD HELP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS MAKE
MORE INFORMED DECISIONS 31 (2009) [hereinafter GAO REPORT 2009], available at
www.gao.gov/new.items/d10113.pdf; GAO REPORT 2007, supra note 58, at 156; THE WHITE
HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY CLIMATE
CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY 14 (2010) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
REPORT], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-
Climate-Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf; JOEL B. SMITH ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE: A CALL FOR FEDERAL LEADERSHIP 2
(2010), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/adaptation-federal-leadership.pdf;
Parry et al., supra note 9, at 19–20.
61. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 22.
62. See GAO REPORT 2009, supra note 60, at 5; SMITH ET AL., supra note 60, at 2.
63. See GAO REPORT 2009, supra note 60, at 6; see also id. at 3 (referencing routine use of
strategies based on historically normal conditions despite recognition of the inaccuracy of such
assumptions under projected climate change scenarios). Additionally, even those with knowledge
of climate change were often unable to apply such knowledge to particular settings. See id. at 37–
38.
64. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 54, at 49–51; Matthew D. Fortney, Devolving Control over
Mildly Contaminated Property: The Local Cleanup Program, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1863, 1896–
1905 (2006).
65. See Buzbee, supra note 54, at 51.
66. Daniel A. Farber, Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues, 1 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 259, 265 (2009).
67. See generally Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence:
Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1655 (2006)
(outlining the reorganization of the intelligence community and discussing the need to find a
balance between consolidation and duplication of agency tasks).
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In the United States, few have focused on the appropriate allocation of
regulatory power among governmental authorities in the context of climate
change adaptation. To the extent that such questions arise in the academic
literature on climate change, the commentary has almost exclusively
focused on issues of federalism and climate change mitigation. In this
setting, numerous scholars have discussed whether the federal government
should have primacy and preempt state regulation of greenhouse gases.68
Yet only a few have discussed such questions in the context of adaptation.69
In addition, though the federal-state relationship is an important one in
determining the appropriate allocation of authority for managing natural
resources and adapting to climate change, it is not, of course, solely a
federalism issue. That is, it is not just a question of the relationship between
national and state governments; it is also a question that implicates the
allocation of power between federal agencies, local governments, other
national governments, and within agencies. However, virtually no scholars
or governmental bodies have discussed this broader question.
One of the few proposals in Congress to implicitly address the federal-
state relationship in the context of climate change adaptation offered a
partial integration of adaptation planning power in the hands of a central
federal authority. The Waxman-Markey American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009 (“ACES”)70 proposed the creation of a White House-
chaired Natural Resources Climate Change Adaptation Panel that would
include the heads of virtually all federal natural resource agencies.71 ACES
tasked this panel with establishing an integrated Natural Resources Climate
Change Adaptation Strategy.72 Each federal natural resource agency would
be required to adopt an adaptation plan determined by the president to be
consistent with the strategy.73 To receive federal funding for adaptation,
68. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, Federal Climate
Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 23, 25
(2009); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 281, 290 (2003); Alexandra B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessons
from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1653–55 (2008); Daniel P.
Schramm, A Federal Midwife: Assisting the States in the Birth of a National Greenhouse Gas
Cap-and-Trade Program, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 65 (2008); Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder,
The Changing Climate of Cooperative Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National
Strategy to Combat Climate Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 251 (2009).
69. See Farber, supra note 66, at 259; Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A
Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1159 (2010).
70. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
Though this bill was passed by the House of Representatives, it was never adopted by the Senate.
See H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
71. H.R. 2454 § 475.
72. § 476.
73. § 478(a).
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states would have to submit an adaptation plan to the secretary of the
interior for certification that the plan is consistent with all goals, priorities,
and standards established by the panel and in the strategy.74 Such a
proposal would substantially increase centralized oversight and control
over federal and state natural resources management.
Though the consolidation or centralization of authority may make
sense in some instances to minimize inefficiencies,75 a close integration of
government institutions has the potential to substantially inhibit the many
advantages of decentralized decision making. Few scholars have discussed
how to allocate regulatory power in formulating adaptation strategies, but
the broader literature on federalism and intersystemic governance remains
quite relevant. Many commenters have detailed the disadvantages of
consolidating or centralizing regulatory authority.76 Many have noted that
decentralized regulation provides the opportunity for the provision of a
range of strategies, thus promoting regulatory experimentation and
opportunities for regulators and the public to learn about the relative
efficacy of different strategies.77
In addition, scholars argue that overlapping jurisdiction can counteract
the potential for agency capture and groupthink,78 promote the integration
of various specialized subject matter competencies, and harness agency
competition to develop more effective regulatory outcomes than
coordinated authority.79 Overlapping authority can also promote agency
accountability by harnessing other regulators to monitor compliance and
74. § 479(b).
75. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 147 (2005) (stating that consolidation of research and information
gathering authority at the federal level would be more efficient in situations where “local research
into health effects, safe exposure thresholds, and potential control strategies could be
duplicative”).
76. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1811–13
(2008); Buzbee, supra note 50, at 324–25, 359–61; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 53, at 70–71,
103; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87
CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1416–17 (1999).
77. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Environmental Federalism, in
PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION
277, 290 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) (contending that “adaptive federalism simultaneously
sustains competitive legislation and administrative processes that promote the refinement of
policies . . . and processes that produce a diverse range of policy options”); Adelman & Engel,
supra note 76, at 1847–48.
78. See IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 9 (1972) (defining groupthink as “[a]
mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,
when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action”).
79. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 67–68; O’Connell, supra note 67, at 1676–77; Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 290 (2005).
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the effectiveness of adopted strategies.80 As a result, many modern
normative models of federalism and intersystemic governance assert that
decentralized and overlapping authority is vital to cultivating regulatory
experimentation, diversity, and effectiveness.81 The challenge is fostering
these benefits of decentralized governance while minimizing any collective
action problems.82
Particularly in the context of climate change mitigation, many scholars
have emphasized the benefits of overlapping state and federal authority in
regulating greenhouse gases.83 Yet even more than for mitigation, natural
resources law and climate change adaptation can fit well in the
overlapping, decentralized governance model promoted by the adaptive
federalism literature. Projecting the local effects of climate change and
developing adaptation strategies to address these involves substantially
more uncertainty than only projecting atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases with and without regulation.84 As a result, the innovation-
promoting features of decentralized governance, which can provide
substantial opportunities for regulatory experimentation to reduce
uncertainty, could be particularly valuable for natural resource adaptation.
In addition, because the effects of climate change are likely to differ
considerably by location and resource, the need for specialized regulation
tailored to particular conditions rather than a uniform standard or cap is
substantially greater in the adaptation context. Concurrently, because
anthropogenic climate change is transforming ecological processes,
accelerating change, and spurring ecological migration, it increases the
interaction of jurisdictions and the extent of regulatory overlap among
government authorities.85 This ecological change and consequent increased
blurring and shifting of regulatory problems makes the argument for
primarily localized control less persuasive. Indeed, at least one scholar has
80. See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental
Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 178–79 (2006).
81. See, e.g., id.; see also Snyder & Binder, supra note 68, at 252 (“Certain redundancies
that result from an overlapping cooperative federalism approach are actually desirable.”).
82. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 77, at 285.
83. See Adelman & Engel, supra note 76, at 1846–49 (discussing the benefits of California
imposing auto emission standards in excess of what the federal Clean Air Act requires); Carlson,
supra note 68, at 310–11 (same); Engel, supra note 80, at 159–62 (same).
84. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
85. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural
Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 208–10 (2010). For example,
regulatory conflict is likely to occur if the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), consistent with
its stated goals that prioritize consumptive economic land uses, decides to introduce a nonnative
species that is well adapted to new climate conditions onto BLM lands, and that species spreads
to a nearby federal wildlife refuge and causes harm to other species in contravention with U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) authority over federal wildlife refuges. See id.
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promoted a reliance on overlapping regulatory authority in the context of
adaptation.86
In short, climate change makes it even more difficult to identify a
single appropriate regulatory scale for managing natural resources. Yet, this
is precisely what makes an overlapping, decentralized governance model
such a great match for natural resources law and climate change adaptation.
Designed correctly, a federal natural resources system can help encourage
innovation, account for both environmental and regulatory diversity, and
promote more effective resource management by providing the opportunity
for inter-jurisdictional information sharing. However, in general, existing
U.S. natural resources governance is poorly designed to promote these
potential benefits.
c. Problems with Regional Collaboration Proposals
To best accommodate the competing objectives of promoting
innovation and learning while minimizing inefficient and ineffectual
resource management, the most common response has been to create
venues for promoting collaborative decision making. Rather than
consolidation or additional centralized agency oversight, many scholars and
agencies have backed the creation of networks for interagency
collaboration and coordination,87 often focused around particular
ecosystems or landscapes.88 Such proposals seek to minimize the negative
features of decentralized regulatory authority by providing additional
opportunities for communication and synchronization rather than through
consolidating decision making authority. As a result, regional regulatory
networks are now quite common in American natural resources
management.89 In fact, the primary federal initiative directed at studying
86. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of
Environmental Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 429 (2010) (“[W]hile it may appear inefficient to have
several agencies at different scales working away on some mutual adaptation policy problem, the
built-in redundancy of Dynamic Federalism can provide significant benefits. It gives the overall
system of governance more rather than less policy space, which surely will be needed for climate
change adaptation.”).
87. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE
AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 1–18 (1998); U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI.
PROGRAM & THE SUBCOMM. ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF
ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 7–60 (2008),
available at http://www.climatescience.gov/ Library/sap/sap4-4/final-report/sap4-4-final-report-
all.pdf; Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 53, at 112–16.
88. See, e.g., R. Edward Grumbine, What Is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY 27, 29–31 (1994); Karkkainen, supra note 46, at 1439–42.
89. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 26–27.
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and considering how to plan for the effects of climate change relies on a
collaborative federal agency network.90
However, these proposals do not really address the core challenge of
reducing and managing uncertainty. Unfortunately, most inter-
jurisdictional government assemblages fail to sufficiently commit to
promoting information sharing, providing opportunities for collaboration,
or otherwise increasing opportunities for inter-governmental learning.
Resource managers have limited information and tools for obtaining,
organizing, and accessing information on their own office’s decisions91 and
typically lack access to the data or strategies of other regional offices or
agencies.92 Though regional collaborations could be set up to provide such
an infrastructure, they rarely focus on doing so. Instead, such programs
merely add more layers of regulation to the already considerable
fragmentation in natural resources management.93 As a result, even
regulators interested in developing adaptation strategies have difficulty
obtaining useful information about the collective management experience
regarding the performance of adopted management strategies.94 When
combined with the considerable uncertainty that exists regarding possible
climate change effects, the information gaps that exist about the efficacy of
past strategies leave regulators with limited capacity to manage uncertainty
that is necessary for effective climate change adaptation.95 Natural
resources thus continue to remain susceptible to regulatory procrastination.
II. THE WEAK ADAPTIVE CAPACITY OF NATURAL RESOURCE GOALS
Many natural resources laws are also poorly suited to foster effective
adaptation because they prioritize preservationism and minimizing human
interaction with natural systems. This understanding is incongruent with
the dynamic nature of ecosystems and the pervasiveness of the human-
nature relationship, particularly in light of modern anthropogenic climate
90. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 9. The Interagency Climate
Change Adaptation Task Force, which includes over twenty federal government agencies, was
created to provide proposals on adaptation planning for federal agencies. The task force serves as
a venue for federal agencies, working with state and local authorities, to communicate,
brainstorm, and collaboratively develop recommendations for the president on potential federal
adaptation strategies. Id.
91. See Adler, supra note 75, at 165–66.
92. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 341 (noting that this is true of FWS employees
negotiating HCPs, and that the problem is exacerbated by high staff turnover at FWS);
Karkkainen, supra note 34, at 496.
93. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 26–28.
94. See id. at 29.
95. See Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five
Principles for Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 58–60 (2010).
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changes. Future climatic changes are likely to make the discrepancy
between these legal goals and the dynamic, integrated natural environment
increasingly apparent. In fact, climate change is likely to set minimal
management and preservationist goals against each other.
A. A Focus on Shielding Nature and Historical Preservation
Much of natural resources law and policy is grounded in preservation
and restoration to a historical baseline.96 Many existing legal goals focus on
promoting ecological inertia or restoration of an ecological system to an
earlier state.97 Many natural resource managers also regularly focus on
promoting the preservation or restoration of existing or past ecological
conditions, typically to a pre-European settlement baseline.98
The less prevalent version of this preservationist approach stresses
shielding nature from active human intervention, thus keeping ecological
systems in (or returning them to) a “natural” state.99 Such an approach is
epitomized by the federal Wilderness Act, which focuses on protecting
areas designated as “wilderness,” defined as:
an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled
by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain[;] . . .
an area of underdeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval
character and influence, without permanent improvements or human
habitation, which is protected and managed so as to preserve its
natural conditions and which (1) generally appears to have been
affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s
work substantially unnoticeable . . . .100
Such areas are not principally protected for their ecological value or
even to preserve the historical condition of the ecosystem. The Act requires
96. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 205–07; see also NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT
POLICIES § 4.1 (2006) [hereinafter NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES], available at
http://www.fws.gov/policy/manuals/ (“[P]reserving park resources and values unimpaired is the
core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SERVICE
MANUAL 601 FW 3.15C [hereinafter FWS SERVICE MANUAL], available at
http://www.fws.gov/policy/601fw3.html (“We do not allow refuge uses or management practices
that result in the maintenance of non-native plant communities unless we determine there is no
feasible alternative . . . . ”).
97. See, e.g., National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (stating a purpose of
“conserv[ing] the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein . . .
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”).
98. See A. Starker Leopold et al., Wildlife Management in the National Parks, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 29, 29–44 (James B. Trefethen ed., 1963).
99. See, e.g., BILL MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 47 (2006) (noting the inherent human
desire to maintain “pristine places, places substantially unaltered by man”).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006).
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federal agencies to manage such areas “in such manner as will leave them
unimpaired for future use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to
provide for the protection of these areas, [and] the preservation of their
wilderness character . . . .”101 Accordingly, though wilderness areas may
“contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational,
scenic, or historical value,”102 they are above all protected because they are
wild and minimally influenced or disturbed by human activity.103
Preservation of the wild character of certain lands has intrinsic value104
and/or provides humans spiritual,105 psychic,106 scientific,107 economic,108
and existence109 benefits. This perspective relies on a human-nature
dualism110 in which wild natural landscapes are accepted as normatively
good111 in contrast with the interference of active human management.112
101. § 1131(a); see also § 1131(c) (stating a wilderness area must be “protected and managed
so as to preserve its natural conditions . . . .”); cf. Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
353 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (“[T]he Wilderness Act requires that the lands and
waters duly designated as wilderness must be left untouched, untrammeled, and unaltered by
commerce.”); High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1133 (E.D.
Cal. 2006) (concluding that manmade river structures did not “further the goals of the Wilderness
Act”); Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40, 42–43 (D.D.C. 1987) (placing the burden of proof
on the secretary of agriculture when enacting measures that “contravene wilderness values
guaranteed by the Wilderness Act”).
102. § 1131(c).
103. See, e.g., LINDA H. GRABER, WILDERNESS AS SACRED SPACE 11 (1976); JACK TURNER,
THE ABSTRACT WILD 120 (1996).
104. See, e.g., Reed Noss, Wilderness Recovery, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE
521, 525–26 (J. Baird Callicott & Michael P. Nelson eds., 1998) (“Some people, for reasons quite
beyond the rational, believe that huge, wild areas are valuable for their own sake.”).
105. See, e.g., RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, WILDERNESS & THE AMERICAN MIND 157 (4th ed.
2001) (“[A]t a time when the force of religion seemed vitiated by the new scientism on the one
hand and social conflict on the other, wilderness acquired special significance as a resuscitator of
faith.”); John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENVTL. L. 955, 979–84
(2005) (documenting the substantial weight given in congressional hearings on the Wilderness
Act to the spiritual value of wilderness).
106. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness, or, Getting Back to the Wrong
Nature, in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 104, at 471, 483.
107. CHRIS MASER, THE REDESIGNED FOREST 174 (1988) (asserting that untouched nature
provides ecologists an invaluable template to learn from, for the restoration of damaged
ecosystems).
108. See Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with Wilderness, 32 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 511–12 (2008) (“[L]ow-impact recreationists who want to access wilderness
account for some of the $300 billion in annual retail sales for gear, food, lodging, entertainment,
and transportation associated with recreating in America’s outdoors. Non-motorized outdoor
recreation pumps $730 billion into the United States economy annually, and supports about 6.5
million jobs.”).
109. See, e.g., John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 781
(1967); Laitos & Gamble, supra note 108, at 510.
110. See MCKIBBEN, supra note 99, at 48 (describing dualism and the idea of nature as “the
separate and wild province, the world apart from man”).
111. See HOLMES ROLSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE
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The more pervasive version of preservation in natural resources law is
essentially antiquarian, emphasizing the minimization of the nonnative and
the preservation or restoration of preexisting ecological communities with
reference to a historical benchmark.113 Many modern conservation and
public land laws and management policies are premised on protecting biota
that preexisted European settlement and inhibiting those that did not.114 For
example, virtually all state and federal invasive species laws, regulations,
and agency policies that regulate the intentional and inadvertent movement
of species are premised on the distinction between native and nonnative.115
“Invasive” under federal law includes as a necessary prerequisite that the
species is nonnative,116 so that destructive native species are not considered
invasive.117 Likewise, on virtually all federal lands there is a strong
presumption in favor of avoiding, limiting, and removing exotic species.118
NATURAL WORLD 238 (1988) (“If we come to a landscape on its own terms, sensitive to its
integrity, wild is always a positive predicate.”); Michael McCloskey, Changing Views of What the
Wilderness System Is All About, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 369, 375 (1999).
112. See ROBERT ELLIOT, FAKING NATURE: THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION
79 (1997); Eric Katz, The Ethical Significance of Human Intervention in Nature, 9 RESTORATION
& MGMT. NOTES 90, 92 (1991) (“Depending on the adequacy of our technology, . . . restored and
redesigned natural areas will appear more or less natural, but they will never be natural—they
will be anthropocentrically designed human artifacts.”).
113. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 231.
114. Id. at 218.
115. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra 96, § 4.4.1.3; FWS SERVICE MANUAL,
supra note 96, at 701 FW 1.4B (classifying indigenous species as those “[o]riginating in and
being produced, growing, or living in a particular region or environment”).
116. Proclamation No. 13,112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183, 6183 (Feb. 3, 1999); NAT’L INVASIVE
SPECIES COUNCIL, MANAGEMENT PLAN: MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE 2 (2001),
available at http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/docs/council/mpfinal.pdf (characterizing
invasive as “a species that is . . . non-native (or alien) to the ecosystem under consideration and
. . . whose introduction causes or is likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to
human[, animal, or plant] health”); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NATIONAL STRATEGY AND
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT 1 (Lynn Starr ed., 2004),
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/invasive
species/documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf.
117. See, e.g., NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, INVASIVE SPECIES DEFINITION
CLARIFICATION AND GUIDANCE WHITE PAPER 3 (2006), available at http://www.doi.gov/
NISC/global/ISAC/ISAC_documents/ISAC%20Definititions%20White%20Paper%20%20-
%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf (“While non-migratory populations can cause problems, they are
not considered an invasive species because they are native.”).
118. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 4.4.4.2 (“All exotic plant and
animal species that are not maintained to meet an identified park purpose will be managed—up to
and including eradication.”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT
MANUAL § 1745.06(A) (1992) [hereinafter BLM MANUAL] (stating that native species shall be
used in any introduction, transplant, restocking, and reestablishment activity unless various
stringent requirements are met); id. § 1745.06(H) (“In designated wilderness areas, . . . [e]xotics
shall not be introduced.”); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., REFUGE MANUAL pt. 7, § 8.1 (1982)
[hereinafter FWS REFUGE SYSTEM MANUAL] (“The continued existence, or management of
exotic plants and animals on refuge lands will be permitted only if: [i] An exotic species has
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To varying degrees, most federal conservation and land management
laws and agencies also emphasize protecting preexisting biotic
communities. The National Park Service Organic Act requires the National
Park Service (“NPS”) “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic
objects and the wild life therein . . . as will leave them unimpaired for the
enjoyment of future generations.”119 This preservation goal mandates that
the NPS cannot approve an action if it could lead to the impairment of any
preexisting resources or values of a national park.120 Similarly, the federal
Endangered Species Act is predominantly concerned with only protecting
native endangered or threatened species within their historical range;121
other implementing regulations or policies for protecting rare species focus
on native species as well.122 In managing federal wildlife refuges under the
National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act (“NWRSIA”),123 the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) emphasizes preserving and
restoring native species’ populations and habitats124 to “historic
become established and its elimination, while desirable, is no longer practicable, or [ii] An exotic
species has become established and maintained on a non-augmented basis for at least 25 years
and does not conflict with refuge objectives.”); FWS SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 96, at 601
FW 3.15(C) (“We do not allow refuge uses or management practices that result in the
maintenance of non-native plant communities unless we determine there is no feasible
alternative.”); U.S. FOREST SERV., FOREST SERVICE MANUAL § 2323.34c(1) (2007) [hereinafter
USFS MANUAL], available at http://www.fs.fed.us/im/directives/ dughtml/fsm.html (“Do not
stock exotic species of fish in wilderness.”); id. § 2323.33a.
119. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
120. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 4.1 (“[P]reserving park resources and
values unimpaired is the core or primary responsibility of NPS managers.”); see also id. § 4.4.2.2
(“Service will strive to restore extirpated native plant and animal species.”); id. § 4.4.1 (“The
National Park Service will maintain as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks all plants and
animals native to park ecosystems.”); id. § 4.4.1.2 (“The Service will strive to protect the full
range of genetic types (genotypes) of native plant and animal populations in the parks by
perpetuating natural evolutionary processes and minimizing human interference with evolving
genetic diversity.”); id. § 4.4.2.5 (“In altered plant communities managed for a specified purpose,
plantings will consist of species that are native to the park or that are historically appropriate for
the period or event commemorated.”).
121. A number of state endangered species laws also refuse to extend protection under their
endangered species acts to nonnative species. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 17-296 (LexisNexis 2008);
FLA. STAT. § 379.2291 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.584(2)(a) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-
331(2) (2009).
122. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 4.4.2.3 (“The Service will
survey for, protect, and strive to recover all species native to national park system units that are
listed under the [ESA]. . . . [T]he Service will inventory other native species that are of special
management concern to parks . . . and will manage them to maintain their natural distribution and
abundance.”).
123. 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006).
124. See, e.g., FWS REFUGE SYSTEM MANUAL, supra note 118, at pt. 7, § 8.1; id. at pt. 7,
§ 12.2.; FWS SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 96, at 601 FW 3.10B(1) (“The System’s focus is on
native species and natural communities such as those found under historic conditions.”); id. at
601 FW 1.9A (“The overarching goal of the Refuge System is to conserve a diversity of fish,
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conditions.”125 Management regulations implementing the Wilderness Act
promote protecting or restoring native populations and natural processes.126
Even though lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)
and the U.S. Forest Service were initially established to be managed for use
rather than preservation, they nonetheless consider their central
conservation objective to be sustaining and enhancing native ecological
systems and species.127
Indeed, the primary strategy of natural resources management—the
reserve model of conservation128—is largely premised on preserving
preexisting resources in certain areas and keeping or removing all others.129
By tying resource conservation to such a historical baseline, this
preservationist approach to natural resources management treats nature as
not only relatively fixed but also context-specific.130
B. Climate Change and the End of Preservation
Though there may be a variety of shortcomings with existing natural
resources law in the United States, it nonetheless has been at least
wildlife, and plants and their habitats . . . with a focus on native species.”).
125. FWS SERVICE MANUAL, supra note 96, at 601 FW 3.12; id. at 601 FW 3.6D (defining
historic conditions as “[c]omposition, structure, and functioning of ecosystems resulting from
natural processes that we believe, based on sound professional judgment, were present prior to
substantial human related changes to the landscape”).
126. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 96, § 6.3.7; BLM MANUAL, supra note 118,
§ 1745.06(H).
127. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(b) (2009) (“The overall goal of the ecological element of
sustainability is to provide a framework to contribute to sustaining native ecological systems
. . . .”); BLM MANUAL, supra note 118, § 1745.02 (stating as the first two objectives of the
BLM’s policy on introductions: “(1) Ensure that management of native, naturalized and exotic
species enhances, restores, and does not reduce the biological and genetic diversity of natural
ecosystems” and “(2) Ensure that the introduction of exotic species is ecologically sound and will
not adversely impact natural ecosystems”); USFS MANUAL, supra note 118, § 2070.2 (seeking to
promote the “use of native plant materials in revegetation, rehabilitation, and restoration of both
aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems”).
128. See, e.g., Terry L. Erwin, An Evolutionary Basis for Conservation Strategies, 253
SCIENCE 750, 750 (1991) (“National parks, wildlife refuges, biosphere reserves, military reserves,
Indian reservations, and other forms of legally protected areas have been established for aesthetic,
political, or practical purposes in the last 150 years.”); C.R. Margules & R.L. Pressey, Systematic
Conservation Planning, 405 NATURE 243, 243 (2000); Rahel et al., supra note 12, at 552.
129. Cf. Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 205–06 (2010) (stating that traditional conservation strategies,
including preserves, “assume[] that what nature needs most is for people to leave it alone”).
130. See, e.g., YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 6 (1977);
Holmes Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural World, in
ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS, ETHICS: THE BROKEN CIRCLE 73, 86 (F. Herbert Bormann & Stephen R.
Kellert eds., 1991) (“A species is what it is where it is.”); Daniel R. Williams et al., Beyond the
Commodity Metaphor: Examining Emotional and Symbolic Attachment to Place, 14 LEISURE SCI.
29, 31 (1992) (examining sense of place and place attachment to wilderness areas).
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moderately effective at maintaining natural resources that under the reserve
model have been set aside. This is in large part because, until recently,
ecological change has been relatively slow since the onset of modern
natural resources law. However, the onset of global anthropogenic climate
change makes it increasingly apparent that the human-nature dualist and
preservationist goals of natural resources law are incongruent with the
interconnectedness of human and natural systems and existing knowledge
about ecological dynamics. Climate change thus reveals the limits of both
of these models of American natural resources law and accelerates the need
to depart from them.
1. The Questionable Benefit of Avoiding Human Management
First, climate change makes it quite apparent that any attempt to
protect nature as untouched is belated and artificial. Of course, many have
argued that the goal of quarantining nature from humanity is an illusory
one131 in light of the historical extent of human effects on what are
considered natural ecological systems.132 Yet, human influence on
ecological systems is even more pervasive as a result of anthropogenic
climate change in addition to other human-induced stressors.133 If
maintaining the human-nature dichotomy embodied by laws like the
Wilderness Act was ever an attainable goal,134 it certainly is not now.135
131. MATHIS WACKERNAGEL & WILLIAM REES, OUR ECOLOGICAL FOOTPRINT: REDUCING
HUMAN IMPACT ON THE EARTH 4 (1996) (“[T]he human enterprise cannot be separated from the
natural world even in our minds because there is no such separation in nature.”); J.B. Ruhl, The
Pardy-Ruhl Dialogue on Ecosystem Management, Part IV: Narrowing and Sharpening the
Questions, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 30–31 (2007) (arguing that “naturalness” and the
“natural/unnatural dichotomy” are human constructs and subjective).
132. See STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, NATURE’S KEEPERS: THE NEW SCIENCE OF NATURE
MANAGEMENT 103–11 (1995) (detailing how repeated burnings by pre-Columbian human
populations shaped what we now consider to be American flora and fauna); William Tucker, Is
Nature Too Good for Us?, in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 34, 42 (Theodore D. Goldfarb ed., 4th ed. 1991) (“Wilderness today
means the land after the Indians have been cleared away but before the settlers have arrived.”).
133. See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 194 (1990) (“[T]here is no longer any part of the Earth that is
untouched by our actions in some way . . . .”); Robert R.M. Verchick, Steinbeck’s Holism:
Science, Literature, and Environmental Law, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 16 (2003) (“[E]very
ecological system on the planet has been touched by human conduct, directly or indirectly,
whether by genetic manipulation, air and water pollution, climate change, or farming.”); Jonathan
Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 12 (1996).
134. But see G. Stanley Kane, Restoration or Preservation? Reflections on a Clash of
Environmental Philosophies, in BEYOND PRESERVATION: RESTORING AND INVENTING
LANDSCAPES 69, 70 (A. Dwight Baldwin, Jr. et al. eds., 1994) (asserting that because “humans
are systematically excluded” from wilderness areas, wilderness areas are “the most astonishingly
unnatural places on earth”).
135. See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on
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At this point, virtually any adaptation strategy would have a
considerable effect on ecological systems. In fact, given the extensive
already-present human-induced barriers to the migration of biota to adjust
to climate change,136 even the choice to not act to adapt to the effects of
climate change would substantially affect ecological systems. As a result,
choosing not to affect ecosystems may simply be impossible. Furthermore,
climate change raises the ecological costs of relying only on passive
management with the goal of keeping less disturbed areas “wild.” As
reserved areas progressively decline and degrade from the combined effects
of anthropogenic climatic change or other human activities, any activity to
ameliorate such effects would increasingly obscure any human-nature
divide. To maintain the “wildness” goal, managers would have to accept
substantially impaired ecosystems as climatic changes ravage existing
reserves. Of course, the election to not actively manage does not mean an
ecosystem will be undisturbed by human activity—global climate change
ensures this will not be so. As a result, climate change more fundamentally
calls into question what the benefit is of isolating a land reserve and barring
its active management to maintain or increase ecological function.
2. The Increasing Infeasibility of Preservation
Of course, rather than doing nothing, another option for dealing with
the effects of climate change might be to actively manage to ensure that
ecological conditions on the reserved land do not change substantially from
current and/or past conditions. Such an objective would be consistent with
the other preservationist strand of natural resources law that seeks to
maintain ecological conditions at a historical baseline.137 However, such
strategies would be fundamentally at odds with existing knowledge about
ecological dynamics, particularly in light of the swift and substantial effects
of global climate change.
American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 870 (1994) (“The accelerating
interaction between humans and the natural environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal
state of nature.”).
136. See Malcolm L. Hunter, Jr., The Biological Landscape, in CREATING A FORESTRY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 57, 62 (Kathryn A. Kohm &
Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997) (explaining how highways and fences can impede dispersal of even
large animals); Brian Lavendel, Ecological Restoration in the Face of Global Climate Change:
Obstacles and Initiatives, 21 ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION 199, 202 (2003) (“Current habitat
fragmentation patterns and human barriers may prevent range shifts.”); see also Emma Marris,
Moving on Assisted Migration, 2 NATURE REP. 112, 113 (2008), available at
http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0809/pdf/climate.2008.86.pdf (“Humans have dominated
the landscape to such an extent that natural dispersal cannot take place in many areas.”).
137. See supra Part II.A.
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The historical preservation goal in existing natural resources law
largely reflects an antiquated equilibrium model of ecology that stresses the
natural stability of ecosystems.138 However, this model has been widely
discredited in ecological science as failing to reflect the complexity and
dynamism of ecosystems.139 Accordingly, the continued regulatory focus
on maintaining or restoring ecosystem constituents for the principal reason
that they previously existed at the site attempts to impose stasis on
ecological communities that otherwise would change over time. Any
attempt to preserve or restore to a historical baseline based on the notion
that doing so somehow serves to conserve ecosystems in a single fixed and
objectively natural state is incompatible with prevailing ecological
knowledge. The embedded division between native and nonnative species
in laws, regulations, and management policies on invasive species, public
lands, and endangered species simply reflects a myopic view of ecology
and evolution.
Despite being based on an erroneous understanding of ecological
stasis, before climate change began, natural resources law and management
were nonetheless able to reasonably approximate historical conditions. To
be sure, defining an original baseline when ecosystems are perpetually in
flux is difficult if not impossible.140 Yet until recently most ecological
change fell within a fairly limited range of variability.141 In light of the
convulsive effects of climate change, however, accomplishing historical
preservation or restoration goals becomes at best increasingly costly and
perhaps even impossible. Many ecologists have concluded that climate
change is likely to stress ecosystems at a rate and to an extent that is
outside the range of historical variability, pressuring biotic assemblages
and communities to transform in fundamental ways.142
138. See Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, as They Apply to
Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 893 (1994).
139. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122–23 (1994) (“[T]he
equilibrium paradigm has been rejected in ecology and replaced with a complex, stochastic
nonequilibrium one.”).
140. See Donald Worster, Nature and the Disorder of History, in REINVENTING NATURE 65,
143 (Michael E. Soulé & Gary Lease eds., 1995) (“[A]ny serious attempt to define the original
state of a community or ecosystem leads to a logical and scientific maze.”).
141. The “stationarity” model that is dominant in modern ecology and gaining momentum in
natural resources management is still premised on “the idea that natural systems fluctuate within
an unchanging envelope of variability.” P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water
Management?, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008). Though this model may recognize that ecosystem
conditions are in flux, it depends on the assumption that any variability in ecosystems is bounded.
See Ruhl, supra note 86, at 393.
142. See, e.g., Parmesan, supra note 9, at 643–44 (discussing phenological changes due to
climate change); Parry et al., supra note 9, at 10–12 (projecting with very high confidence
increased harm to coastal and freshwater resources); Rahel et al., supra note 12, at 557 (“Climate
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In such circumstances, climate change will require increasingly active
human management to maintain preservation goals that will be
progressively more costly and perhaps impossible to meet for some
ecosystems. In fact, reserved lands may become inhospitable to and
fundamentally incompatible with the very resources they were established
to protect.143 At the same time, the value of preserving an ecosystem in its
historical condition becomes increasingly questionable. Historical
ecological preservation or restoration still may provide important scientific,
educational, and cultural benefits in particular cases.144 However, such
value will have to be weighed against the potential loss of ecological
function that comes with (1) actively cultivating resources that might be
increasingly incompatible with climatic conditions and (2) actively
preventing the arrival of other biological resources that otherwise would
immigrate to the reserve. Climate change ensures that in many cases there
will be escalating ecological and other costs, and diminishing gains from
engaging in ecosystem preservation and restoration.
Finally, by making ecological preservation and restoration
increasingly an active management enterprise, global anthropogenic
climate change pits the historical preservation goal against the goal of
avoiding human management of ecological systems. In the past, such goals
may have been in tension with each other, as at least passive management
would be needed to keep preserved areas as they are. Yet at least the
reserve model of cordoning off and isolating resource lands was
theoretically congruent with both keeping nature as it is and leaving it
alone. In the context of climate change, resource managers may choose to
not manage ecological systems, leaving reserved areas to rearrange as
climatic changes occur. Alternatively, managers could choose to actively
manage the reserve to ensure that it maintains similar ecological conditions
as in the past. However, they will not be able to do both.145
In fact, as global climatic changes exert increasing pressure on biota in
a wide range of ecosystems to adapt, the primary goal should neither be
changes . . . may cause environmental conditions to exceed the historic range of variability to
which species are adapted.”); Ryan et al., supra note 11, at 96–97 (projecting greater disturbance
to forests from fire, pestilence, and disease).
143. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 247.
144. See, e.g., Stephen T. Jackson & Richard J. Hobbs, Ecological Restoration in the Light of
Ecological History, 325 SCIENCE 567, 568 (2009) (asserting that even with global climate
change, historical restoration will provide useful data about ecosystems and the effectiveness of
management responses to disruptions).
145. Cf. Cronon, supra note 106, at 485 (“To the extent that biological diversity (indeed, even
wilderness itself) is likely to survive in the future only by the most vigilant and self-conscious
management of the ecosystems that sustain it, the ideology of wilderness is potentially in direct
conflict with the very thing it encourages us to protect.”).
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preventing natural resources management strategies from affecting natural
systems nor avoiding a departure of ecological conditions from a historical
norm. At best, both avoiding human management and actively managing
ecosystems to maintain historical conditions would be increasingly costly,
yet provide diminishing and questionable benefits given projected climate
changes. Consequently, neither shielding nature from human interference
nor the active management of reserve lands to maintain historical
conditions are likely to be viable goals for adapting natural resources to the
effects of climate change. Rather, natural resources management must be
principally directed at anticipating future climatic conditions, developing
mechanisms for assessing the value of potential ecological components and
processes, weighing tradeoffs between such potential components and
processes, and minimizing the detrimental and maximizing the beneficial
consequences from management strategies and other human activities on
natural systems.146
III. A SYNERGISTIC PROMOTION OF STASIS
Though both existing management processes and the objectives of
natural resources law in the United States provide distinct limitations on the
capacity of natural resources management to adapt to the effects of climate
change, they are interconnected and mutually reinforcing in a number of
ways. Of course, the central theme that links the static view of nature
enshrined in natural resources law and the prevalent rigid model of
regulatory decision making together is that both are premised on promoting
stasis and stability.147 Existing natural resources law is based on static or
fixed models of nature and decision making—both the ends to which
natural resources should be managed and the means through which
government institutions and the public more generally learn and decide. In
general, administrative law continues to task natural resource agencies with
providing front-end, comprehensive, and conclusive strategies for
managing what are typically very complex systems and problems about
which there regularly is incomplete information.148
This model based on stasis is the result of a longstanding and
pervasive emphasis on an understanding of law as an attempt to provide
certainty and stability through legal rules.149 Indeed, courts and Congress
146. Wiener, supra note 133, at 14 (“Change is inevitable, and what matters is not the false
choice of preservation versus change, but the real choice of which changes are benign and which
are adverse.”).
147. See supra Part II.A.
148. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 37–38.
149. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1977) (identifying “introducing
such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them” as one of the
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have incorporated this emphasis on certainty into the conventional
administrative law rulemaking process, which only allows subsequent
adjustments to adopted rules through engaging in the lengthy and costly
rulemaking process yet again.150 Such a step at most, occurs sporadically
over a rule’s lifetime. To be sure, over the past few decades proponents of
adaptive management have increasingly emphasized a more nuanced
approach that encourages agencies to constantly review, reevaluate, and, if
necessary, change their decisions in order to adapt to changing
circumstances or improve ineffective policy.151 However, a fundamental
and yet unresolved tension remains between the competing goals of
providing certainty through front-end decision making and the need for
provisionalism in light of limited information and changes in circumstances
that inevitably arise in the regulatory process.152 Though there are
encouraging signs that some courts recognize the need for provisionalism
and seek to accommodate the need for adaptive management, courts
continue to reject elements of adaptive management plans that allow
subsequent adjustment when not expressly allowed under enabling statutes
eight major ways that a legal system may be misused); B.E. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE,
at Appeal § 481, at 541 (5th ed. 2008) (noting that stare decisis “is based on the assumption that
certainty, predictability, and stability in the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e.,
that parties should be able to regulate their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable
assurance of the governing rules of law”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a
Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (identifying “stability” as
the third of five elements that constitute the Rule of Law); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its
Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 214–15 (1979) (“Laws
should be relatively stable. They should not be changed too often. If they are frequently changed
people will find it difficult to find out what the law is at any given moment and will be constantly
in fear that the law has been changed since they last learnt what it was.”); Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989).
150. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v.
D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“To allow an agency to make a
fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment
obviously would undermine [the] APA requirements.”); Nat’l Family Planning & Reprod. Health
Ass’n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that agencies cannot create
new constructions of rules that substantially alter their meaning without undergoing notice and
comment rulemaking).
151. See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 424, 428–29, 438 (2010) (“The legal view of a resource management plan is that it
comprehensively evaluates all rational considerations at once and then flips a toggle switch; the
adaptive management approach twiddles the dial as information trickles in.”).
152. See id. at 443–44. Ruhl and Fischman noted that as of May 2010 there were thirty-one
federal court decisions struggling with the legality of adaptive management, and that the
government had lost more than half of them. Id. at 444–45. However, at least some courts are not
categorically rejecting adaptive management approaches; in particular, adaptive management
programs that rely on large-scale plans that tie site-specific adaptive components to data in larger
cumulative studies and contain their adaptive elements within the outer bounds of the legally
required substantive management criteria have been successful. See id. at 445.
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or underlying regulations.153 Furthermore, because of budget constraints,
lack of accountability, and other disincentives, government officials often
have limited interest in the persistent monitoring and subsequent
adjustment of decisions in furtherance of program goals that learning
requires.154 In short, existing natural resources management and the
administrative law that governs it remain premised on a fairly static, front-
end model of decision making.
Yet as detailed earlier, existing scientific knowledge makes quite
evident that natural systems are far from static,155 and the adaptive
management literature suggests that regulatory decision making need not
be either.156 Existing natural resource legal processes and goals simply do
not reflect how natural systems are complex adaptive systems or how
information is effectively obtained.157 In the past, the conventional static
model may have had substantial advantages. Such a clear bright-line
mandate for resource conservation could serve to counteract political
opposition from focused economic interests during implementation.158
Furthermore, the costs of relying on a historical baseline are likely to be
more modest, as there is less need for expensive post-decision monitoring
of ambient effects or the adjustment of decisions to account for changed
conditions.159 Though decisions in conventional natural resources
management undoubtedly were subject to uncertainty and involved
assessments of dynamic ecological conditions, such uncertainty and
ecological change was relatively bounded. Accordingly, though
153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 24, at 29, 38; Camacho, supra note 28, at 327–29.
Another constraint on agencies is that many natural resources laws assign agencies the duty to
observe and manage ecological systems based on a human time scale that is very compressed. See
Camacho, supra note 85, at 233. This myopia is reinforced by a representative democratic system
that relies on two-, four-, or six-year election cycles, focusing attention on short-term baselines
and overlooking longer-term shifts.
155. See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
157. See Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 196–97 (“[W]e have constructed an architecture of
laws and management systems that are poorly matched to the challenge of managing ecosystems
as complex dynamic systems.”).
158. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 245–46 (stating that a bright-line historical baseline has
the advantage of simplicity and serving as a shield from intense political pressure); Holly
Doremus, Adapting to Climate Change Through Law that Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 9), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1628255 (stating environmental law traditionally relied on a number of
uncompromising conservation precommitments that would buttress conservation goals in the face
of political pressure).
159. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 940 (2002) (“Mandatory
postdecision monitoring is not without its disadvantages, the most obvious of which is cost.
Monitoring is not free.”).
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assessments made for initial management decisions were perhaps crude,
there nonetheless were plausible reasons for treating protected lands as
static in the past.
However, those reasons are significantly less persuasive as a result of
global anthropogenic climate change. Climate change threatens to make
static preservationism very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.160 As
such, if the conservation objectives of natural resources law are not
changed from a preservationist focus, climate change threatens to make law
and conservation seem futile.161 Perhaps more importantly, continuing to
manage based solely on an initial determination grounded in limited
information makes little sense, particularly in the context of natural
resource adaptation in which uncertainty is considerable. Similarly, failing
to monitor for changes in background conditions and take advantage of the
opportunity to gain new information about the performance of adopted
strategies would almost certainly prove costly and lead to ineffective
management. Accordingly, as an accelerant of change and promoter of
uncertainty, climate change makes the rigidity that exists in natural
resources law particularly evident and unsustainable.
The substantive and procedural limitations of existing natural
resources governance also depend on each other in a number of ways, and
their joint incompatibility with climate change further reinforces the need
for a departure from such static regulatory goals and processes. First, the
static model of nature promoted by the historical preservationism goal
serves to fortify natural resources law’s unadaptive model of regulation.
The prevailing front-end, comprehensive rationality approach embedded in
natural resources regulatory decision making assumes and relies on a
presumption that conditions are not likely to change significantly after the
initial decision.162 Because historical preservationism has similarly
presumed that ecological conditions do not change significantly, it has
served to reinforce a reliance on a front-end, static regulatory process.
However, this justification for rigid regulatory decision making becomes
significantly weaker once one accepts that natural systems are likely to
change over time.
Second, the static understanding of nature assumed by a historical
preservationist goal is also congruent with the regulatory segmentation
currently prevalent in American natural resources governance.163 Because
of the inherent mutability and mobility of ecosystems and their
160. See supra Part I.A.
161. See Craig, supra note 95, at 33–35.
162. See Karkkainen, supra note 27, at 200–01.
163. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
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constituents, a historical preservation goal could only be possible if lands
subject to such an objective were segmented and treated as independent
from others. Regulatory segmentation by definition allows different types
of lands to be segmented and thus more easily treated as distinct from or
unconnected to others. In this sense, existing regulatory fragmentation is in
part a symptom of historical preservation goals.
Climate change makes obvious, however, that biota will need to
change or shift to accommodate climatic shifts or face extinction.164 A
fragmented system is likely to be particularly inadequate at managing the
broad, landscape-scale transformations expected from climate change. For
many species on reserve lands, changes in climate conditions will make
existing protected ranges unsuitable as habitats, necessitating a shift in
range165 often from one jurisdiction to another (e.g., from public to private
land, from state to federal land, or from federal BLM land to federal
wilderness areas). In addition to both topographical and human-induced
physical dispersal barriers, many such range shifts will be hindered by
differences in management between jurisdictions. Regulatory conflict is
also likely to occur between place-based preservationist laws (e.g., those
governing national parks management)166 and species-focused
preservationist laws (e.g., endangered species laws).167 If a member of a
listed endangered species migrates into a national park outside its historical
range, such movement might place preservationist national park
management (perhaps even requiring removal) in conflict with such federal
or state endangered species law. In addition, a member of an endangered
species that attempts to migrate into areas outside its historical range might
164. See, e.g., O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Assisted Colonization and Rapid Climate Change,
321 SCIENCE 345, 345 (2008) (“Rapid climatic change has already caused changes to the
distributions of many plants and animals, leading to severe range contractions and the extinction
of some species.”); Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11 (“The resilience of many ecosystems is likely
to be exceeded this century by an unprecedented combination of climate change, associated
disturbances . . . and other global change drivers . . . .”); Thompson Webb III, Past Changes in
Vegetation and Climate: Lessons for the Future, in GLOBAL WARMING AND BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, supra note 13, at 59, 60 (“[I]t is likely many plant species will be unable to move
their ranges rapidly enough to keep up with such a rapidly shifting climate . . . .”).
165. See Parry et al., supra note 9, at 11 (projecting that twenty to thirty percent of species
will face an “increased” risk of extinction if average global temperatures rise more than 1.5 to 2.5
degrees Celsius). A leading but often contested article in Nature concluded that, by 2050, up to
two-thirds of species will need to migrate or be moved to new habitats to survive. See Chris D.
Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 146 (2004).
166. See National Park Service Organic Acts, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (1916)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1–4 (2006)).
167. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 17-296 (LexisNexis 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-2-105.5 (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 379.231 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 379.2291 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-807 (LexisNexis
2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.584(2)(a) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-331(2) (2009).
CAMACHO.BKI 6/13/2011 1:55 PM
2011] NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1439
be considered nonnative and potentially invasive under federal or state
invasive species laws.
As a result of climate change, then, regulatory segmentation in natural
resources law is likely to lead to increased conflict between inconsistent
management objectives. At a minimum, such goals will have to be
reconciled, and management coordinated, to limit unintended detrimental
effects of management of each area on the others. Yet, the acceptance that
biota may need to adapt to climatic changes by shifting their range to other
landscapes necessitates a departure not only from a purely segmented
focus, but also from historical preservationism. If natural resources
management continues to require the maintenance of historical conditions
as regulatory fragmentation combines with other environmental and
human-induced stressors to hinder species migrations, managers will have
to accept that ecological systems will continue to decline in ecological
diversity and function.168
Third, like its historical preservationist counterpart, the human-nature
dualism embedded in wilderness preservation has also influenced and
contributed to regulatory segmentation by facilitating and promoting the
severance of human-shaped landscapes from “natural” landscapes. In this
sense, segmentation is needed to achieve not only the bifurcation between
native and nonnative, but also the human and nature dualism. To
accommodate the goal of keeping humans out of pristine areas, natural
resources law created areas where human activities and nonnative species
are acceptable and prevalent, and others where they are to be prevented,
minimized, or their effects mitigated. This dichotomy places human-
dominated landscapes such as agricultural, suburban, and urban lands on
one side, and reserve lands subject to a wilderness mandate on the other.169
Because this division focuses on the extent of human influence, it is
perhaps unsurprising that in man-made and other human-dominated
environments, the law allows extensive human interference to deal with
and manage change without controversy. Adaptations to prepare for or
reduce the effects of climate change that involve changes in urban
infrastructure or crop selection are accepted, while active management such
as assisted migration170 is much more contentious for “natural,” less
disturbed landscapes.
168. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 247.
169. Of course, human influence pervades even reserved lands, so a range of human uses
exist on reserved public lands as well. As a result, currently there is more of a continuum of
public lands, which range from the more disturbed (such as BLM grazing or mining lands) to less
manipulated areas (such as federal wilderness).
170. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 211–13.
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In enabling this severance, the human-nature dualism facilitated
problems in natural resources management. In particular, the bifurcation
advanced by a human-nature dualism makes it easier to disregard or forget
that human-dominated landscapes and less disturbed lands massively
influence each other. Segmentation of lands might have helped much of the
public see a division between human activities on the one hand and their
effects on natural systems on the other.171 Aldo Leopold argued that such
segmentation essentially allowed reserved lands to serve as an excuse for
failing to rectify or improve the management of human-dominated
landscapes.172 More importantly, even if natural resource managers
acknowledge that natural and human systems are inextricably connected,
regulatory segmentation makes it considerably more difficult to address.
Though there are many factors exogenous to land reserves that affect them,
the segmentation model fostered by dualism raises significant barriers for
natural resource managers to address these effects.
Finally, the lack of procedural flexibility and the substantive emphasis
on preservationism in natural resources law both function to devolve
significant control of decision making to natural resource managers. First,
by not imposing requirements and providing incentives to natural resource
managers to monitor, revisit, and adjust decisions publicly, existing natural
resources law makes it difficult for such agencies to be reviewed and
evaluated by legislatures, other administrative bodies, or members of the
171. Cf. Cronon, supra note 106, at 484–85 (“[T]o the extent that we live in an urban-
industrial civilization but at the same time pretend to ourselves that our real home is in the
wilderness, to just that extent we give ourselves permission to evade responsibility for the lives
we actually lead. We inhabit civilization while holding some part of ourselves—what we imagine
to be the most precious part—aloof from its entanglements. We work our nine-to-five jobs in its
institutions, we eat its food, we drive its cars (not least to reach the wilderness), we benefit from
the intricate and all too invisible networks with which it shelters us, all the while pretending that
these things are not an essential part of who we are. By imagining that our true home is in the
wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually inhabit.”); Ramachandra Guha, Radical
American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique, in THE
GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 104, at 231, 239 (“[In the United States] the
enjoyment of nature is an integral part of the consumer society. The private automobile (and the
life style it has spawned) is in many respects the ultimate ecological villain, and an untouched
wilderness the prototype of ecological harmony; yet, for most Americans it is perfectly consistent
to drive a thousand miles to spend a holiday in a national park.”).
172. See Aldo Leopold, Land-Use and Democracy, AUDUBON, Sept.–Oct. 1942, at 259,
reprinted in THE RIVER OF THE MOTHER OF GOD AND OTHER ESSAYS BY ALDO LEOPOLD 295,
299 (Susan L. Flader & J. Baird Callicot eds., 1991) (“It seems to me that sanctuaries are akin to
monasticism in the dark ages. The world was so wicked it was better to have islands of decency
than none at all. . . . Once established, these islands became an alibi for lack of private reform.
People said: ‘We pay the bills for all this virtue. Let goodness stay where it belongs, and not
pester practical folks who have to run the world.’ . . . The more monasteries or sanctuaries, the
grimmer the incongruity between inside and outside.”).
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general public.173 Not requiring agencies to learn also makes such public
decisionmakers less accountable to the public.174
In addition, because a historical preservationist model fundamentally
relies on a scientific evaluation of current or past conditions for the
normative determination of what future conditions should be, it treats
natural resources management as a scientific, expert-driven analysis. A
natural resources management goal tethered to a historical baseline treats
what currently exists (or historically existed) as what should exist in the
future. In this sense, historical preservationism converts ecology into a
normative science.175 As a result, a historical preservation management goal
makes the scientific determination of existing or past conditions the
primary management question. It thus serves to treat natural resources
management as the primary province of ecologists and resource managers.
Together with the diminished accountability that arises from the prevailing
weakness of public monitoring and adaptive management, preservationism
has enabled natural resources management to rely heavily on an ostensibly
expert-driven model of administrative regulation. As detailed below, this
focus on expertise to determine management goals will undoubtedly need
to be reformulated for natural resources law to effectively work to help
ecological systems and natural resources law itself adapt to the rapid and
accelerating effects of a changing climate.
IV. MAKING NATURAL RESOURCES LAW MORE ADAPTABLE
Because the substantive and procedural shortcomings of natural
resources law detailed above have been mutually reinforcing, the
alterations necessary to make natural resources management more effective
are likely to be linked as well. Natural resources law must be modified to
173. See Biber, supra note 25, at 45–47 (describing how monitoring data can provide courts
with an independent empirical basis for closer review of agency decisions).
174. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 343–44 (“[S]ubjecting program implementation to
ongoing, open monitoring and evaluation . . . serves to curb opportunities for bias. . . . By
providing an open framework for evaluating a regulatory program, adaptive regulation can enlist
the public and Congress to help the regulatory process evolve.”); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 288, 321 (1998)
(asserting that public participation in regulator performance evaluation can increase the
accountability of regulatory institutions); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549, 638, 663–66 (2000) (arguing that including private actors in the
regulatory process can foster accountability).
175. Cf. Mark Sagoff, Native to a Place, or What’s Wrong with Exotic Species?, in VALUES
AT SEA: ETHICS FOR THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 93, 106 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 2003)
(“No one can say scientifically that it is better to stand by the native oyster than to introduce the
alien competitor. . . . Biological and ecological science . . . describes what may happen if
nonnative [species] are allowed to prosper in the bay. These sciences may predict but cannot
evaluate the consequences. Ecology should not attempt to become a normative science.”).
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be better adapted to a dynamic world. Both the means and the ends of
natural resources management must be changed to better prepare for the
effects of climate change.
As I have argued elsewhere,176 natural resources law needs to move
more toward a model of active management that is not primarily motivated
by a fidelity to past conditions. Rather than leaving nature alone, or putting
things the way they were, natural resources laws must be refocused toward
promoting desirable future ecological conditions in light of climatic
changes. Managers and regulators must be charged with protecting and
promoting the fitness and resilience of valuable ecosystem processes,
instead of focusing on particular preexisting species or collections of
species. Management goals must be oriented toward facilitating the
development of new valuable biotic interactions rather than hindering them
based on devotion to the past. This reorientation would often seek to
promote existing ecological constituents by using past conditions as a
guide. However, its primary focus would not be to revert to historic
conditions but rather to ensure that the ecosystem is healthy under future
conditions. Where such ecological fitness cannot be achieved through
merely passive management, more active approaches should be considered.
A rejection of the treatment of humans and nature as separate and
distinct does not lead to an unconditional acceptance of the permissibility
of active management of all resource areas. To be sure, there may be many
significant precautionary reasons for not actively managing reserve areas.
Perhaps the most important reason for not managing reserve areas actively
is the substantial uncertainty that exists regarding the efficacy and
unintended effects of human interventions.177 There are many examples of
human interventions that have had significant adverse and inadvertent
effects on ecological systems,178 and these examples and the increased
uncertainty that accompanies climate change counsel strongly against the
wholesale reliance on active management of ecosystems. Natural resources
management certainly must account for the risks and limited knowledge
regarding potential adaptation strategies in trying to minimize negative and
maximize desirable future change.
However, the advent of climate change also makes clear that choosing
to not employ strategies that promote ecological health on the basis that
176. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 243–53.
177. See id. at 185–86.
178. See, e.g., id. (describing several species introductions that became invasive, such as
certain oyster species and kudzu in the United States and rabbits and cane toads in Australia);
Anthony Ricciardi & Daniel Simberloff, Assisted Colonization Is Not a Viable Conservation
Strategy, 24 TRENDS ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 248, 249–50 (2009) (arguing that species
translocation may have a severe impact on food webs and other ecosystem attributes).
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doing so will interfere with natural wild areas will increasingly have
significant irreparable ecological costs that must be considered. In all
likelihood, there will be many instances in which passive management
strategies will be preferable because of uncertainties regarding the effects
of more active human intervention. Yet as a result of climate change, there
increasingly will be circumstances in which active management may be
warranted to prevent or minimize substantial losses in ecological health. Of
course, a paradigm shift toward conserving ecological function raises many
difficult questions that remain largely unexplored in natural resources law.
Perhaps the most important of these is that though climate change reveals
that a fidelity to stasis is increasingly untenable, an alternative, future-
focused baseline is still difficult to define.179 Such a focus opens up the
natural resources management process to the substantially more complex
inquiry into the relative value of the various natural resources under
consideration for protection or use. Even if one limits the management
objective solely to maximizing ecosystem function or health and overlooks
other aesthetic, recreational, economic, and historic considerations, an
analysis of ecological value remains open to a variety of interpretations.
Ecological considerations may be directed toward promoting
biodiversity,180 though there remains a host of different ways to define
and/or measure biodiversity;181 toward maximizing ecosystem
productivity,182 however defined; or even some combination thereof. In
179. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 245.
180. See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, Working Both (Positivist) Ends Toward a New (Pragmatist) Middle
in Environmental Law, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 542 (2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER,
ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD
(1999)) (“Scientific research suggests that the concept of biological diversity, or biodiversity, is
the key metric of ecosystem health.”).
181. For a discussion of various measures of biodiversity, see Andy Purvis & Andy Hector,
Getting the Measure of Biodiversity, 405 NATURE 212, 212–18 (2000); see also ANNE E.
MAGURRAN, MEASURING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 9 (2004) (providing an overview of the
primary procedure through which diversity is measured, including modeling, statistics, and
estimation techniques); Brian H. Walker, Biodiversity and Ecological Redundancy, 6
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 18, 19 (1992) (“Decline in biodiversity includes all those changes that
have to do with reducing or simplifying biological heterogeneity, from individuals to regions.
Included are such phenomena as phenotypic plasticity; genetic variability within a population
(allowing for a wide range of genotypic responses to environmental conditions); ecotypic
variation (genetic variability between populations within a species); species richness (the number
of species in a community); species (alpha) diversity (involving both the number of species and
the relative numbers of individuals per species); functional diversity (the relative abundances of
functionally different kinds of organisms); gradient (beta) diversity, which extends to diversity
resulting from speciation of ecological equivalents (gamma or delta diversity); community
diversity (the number, sizes, and spatial distribution of communities, sometimes referred to as
patchiness); and even the diversity of the scales of patchiness (landscape diversity).”).
182. See, e.g., Alyson C. Flournoy et al., Harnessing the Power of Information to Protect Our
Public Natural Resource Legacy, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1575, 1594 (2008).
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short, there is no universal agreement regarding what ecosystem health
means.
To be sure, just as different public lands in the United States are
subject to a diversity of management goals,183 some reserve lands could be
managed to prioritize the promotion of biodiversity while others could
emphasize ecosystem productivity. More broadly, different lands could
focus on promoting other social values such as recreational, aesthetic,
historic, scientific, or economic uses. Indeed, some reserves could rely on
more active management of ecological areas while others continue to
concentrate on more passive management. This less intrusive approach
might be particularly useful in circumstances in which the ecological area
will be fairly ecologically stable with climate change, is poorly understood,
and is ecologically sensitive. In such circumstances—indeed perhaps in
many circumstances—it might make more sense to leave ecological
systems alone. Resource managers and legislators need to weigh the
possibility, however, that ignoring or barring management of an ecological
community might lead to substantial costs in ecological diversity and/or
productivity.
Just as the goal of promoting future ecological value remains
embryonic, there is also not a developed approach for identifying the
appropriate ecological units resource managers should focus on in
management, prioritization, or making tradeoffs between competing
resource uses or services184 or what role the distributive effects of such
tradeoffs should serve in natural resources management. A key underlying
challenge of relying on a goal that seeks to promote desired future
conditions is that doing so makes natural resources management more
vulnerable to the political pressures often wielded against natural resource
conservation.185 In addition, a focus on valuing ecosystem services and
ecological health is a more complicated message for coordinating and
mobilizing conservation groups and other diffuse stakeholders than the
crude simplicity of preservationist and dualist goals. As such, concurrent
with removing the strict preservationist baseline, natural resources law
183. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (establishing the National Park Service’s core
preservation mandate of conserving “the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild
life therein . . . as will leave them unimpaired”), and 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006) (providing
the Wilderness Act’s central goal of preserving wilderness areas of “undeveloped Federal land
retaining its primeval character and influence”), with 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3) (2006) (providing
the National Forest Management Act’s mandate that national forests must be managed for
multiple uses, including resource extraction and timber harvest).
184. See Camacho, supra note 85, at 248–53.
185. See David A. Dana, Existence Value and Federal Preservation Regulation, 28 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 373 (2004).
CAMACHO.BKI 6/13/2011 1:55 PM
2011] NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1445
must incorporate other procedural mechanisms that protect conservation
uses over more tangible and easily priced consumptive uses.186
Undoubtedly, scientific data can and must facilitate the resolution of
these and other complicated questions. Managers would need to engage in
at least three enterprises: (1) identifying and reducing uncertainty about
projected shifts in climatic and ecological conditions, (2) identifying and
reducing uncertainty about the past performance and likely effectiveness of
possible management strategies, and (3) assessing the ecological and social
value of and synergy between possible ecological constituents. This
substantive vision of natural resources management would thus still rely on
substantial manager expertise in determining ecological value, but it would
place considerably greater information gathering pressure on already
isolated and information-deprived natural resource managers.
More fundamentally, climate change makes clear that natural
resources management should not be the sole province of ecologists or
other scientific experts. As natural resources law necessarily becomes
untethered to a historical baseline, the key questions raised regarding the
appropriate goals and priorities for managing natural resources are not
answerable exclusively through a scientific, objective analysis. These value
and tradeoff judgments are public policy decisions and should be resolved
though the democratic process of decision making.187 Though science will
be integral to developing approaches to both understanding ecological
systems and measuring the value of particular components, such tradeoff
decisions are ultimately normative.188
Because this vision of natural resources management is even less
scientific, it emphasizes that natural resources law’s core function should
be improving the process of natural resource decision making. Natural
resources law under climate change has the potential to be a great fit for
overlapping, decentralized governance. Because of the massive uncertainty
regarding the nature and scope of local effects of climate change,189 it is
hard to identify a single appropriate regulatory scale. Such characteristics
fit well with a decision-making model that relies on multiple overlapping
authorities. Overlapping jurisdiction can provide regulatory redundancy to
186. See, e.g., Doremus, supra note 158 (manuscript at 25–37) (identifying a number of
substantive and procedural mechanisms to buttress long-term conservation goals in the face of
short-term economic interests).
187. Cf. Donald Waller, Getting Back to the Right Nature: A Reply to Cronon’s “The Trouble
with Wilderness,” in THE GREAT NEW WILDERNESS DEBATE, supra note 104, at 540, 563 (“Our
science will also allow us to critically evaluate what will, and what will not, suffice to stem the
hemorrhage of biodiversity. Science, however, is only a tool whose success in these efforts will
depend utterly on our values.”).
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text.
CAMACHO.BKI 6/13/2011 1:55 PM
1446 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89
fill in regulatory gaps and thus provide resiliency.190 In addition, the
existence of many different regulatory authorities provides considerable
opportunities for experimentation and interagency learning.191 However, as
detailed earlier, existing natural resources governance is poorly designed to
promote these potential benefits.192 Natural resources law currently leaves
resource managers isolated in addressing uncertain regulatory problems
and fails to pressure regulators to learn.
To address the limitations of existing natural resources governance, I
have previously advocated for the adoption of a cross-jurisdictional
infrastructure to promote agency learning and accountability.193 One
component of this infrastructure is an adaptive governance framework that
builds on adaptive management theory, including required monitoring,
assessment, and adjustment of all agency strategies and processes regarding
their progress toward identified regulatory goals.194 Though this framework
builds on adaptive management, it seeks to rely on the integration of
monitoring, assessment, and evaluation throughout the regulatory process
and not only through the use of formal adaptive management. The express
use of adaptive management may be valuable and/or necessary in some
circumstances, but a range of less rigid, rigorous, and expensive forms of
adaptive regulation that mandate and incentivize agency and stakeholder
monitoring, contingency planning, and periodic adjustment of regulatory
decisions could and should be relied on as well.195 A systematic process of
sustained information collection and periodic alteration of regulatory
strategies should apply throughout the regulatory process, including not
only the assessment of individual resource decisions and management
plans, but also the evaluation of adopted decision processes and agencies
against programmatic goals.196
In addition, this learning infrastructure would include a shared and
public information network that collects and disseminates information
190. See Engel, supra note 80, at 178; Schapiro, supra note 79, at 290; Biber, supra note 25,
at 71. But see O’Connell, supra note 67, at 1679–80 (noting that redundancy raises a risk of
agency freeriding and under-regulation).
191. See Adler, supra note 75, at 137 (“[D]ecentralization, and the resulting policy
experimentation and interjurisdictional competition, can encourage policy innovation as
policymakers seek to meet the economic, environmental, and other demands of their constituents.
As a result of such competition, states are able to learn from each others’ successes and
failures. This competition allows states to act as environmental ‘laboratories’ developing new and
improved ways of addressing environmental concerns.”) (citations omitted).
192. See supra Part I.B.
193. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 64–76.
194. Id. at 72–73.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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between jurisdictions.197 The information network should include sustained
collection and generation of ambient monitoring data, particularly on
climate change effects, the development of localized models for projecting
future effects, and information on potential adaptation strategies.198 More
importantly, it should also compile data on the past and continued
performance of adopted management strategies in every jurisdiction.
Encouragingly, the White House Interagency Climate Change
Adaptation Task Force has recommended the development of a federal
information clearinghouse and other measures consistent with developing
the information generation and dissemination capacity of regulators.199 The
task force also suggested encouraging ongoing federal agency
prioritization, monitoring, evaluation, and learning to promote better
adaptation planning.200 Congruent with these goals, the task force
recommended the establishment of performance metrics for evaluating
federal adaptation efforts, as well as the development of partnerships and
regional consortia to formulate adaptation strategies.201 In March 2011,
relying on this report, the White House Council on Environmental Quality
(“CEQ”) issued instructions to all federal agencies to (1) develop a climate
change adaptation policy statement by June 2011 that adopts “the
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force’s guiding principles
and framework for adaptation planning,” (2) submit to CEQ an agency
climate adaptation plan by June 2012, and (3) “pursue opportunities for
sharing and coordination across the Federal community.”202 Though these
activities primarily focus on federal-level adaptation,203 they nonetheless
indicate that the current administration is at least considering, if not moving
toward, the development of an information infrastructure for managing
uncertainty in climate change adaptation planning and management.
To this end, recently, at least some federal agencies are working to
increase their capacity to collect climate data and create clearinghouses to
distribute scientific information to their regional offices, state agencies, and
the public related to climate change adaptation planning.204 The Department
197. Id. at 65–66.
198. Id. at 66.
199. See INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 60, at 33–34.
200. See id. at 27–29.
201. See id. at 49–51.
202. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, INSTRUCTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION PLANNING IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXECUTIVE ORDER 13514, at 3–5 (2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/
ADAPTATION%20FINAL%20IMPLEMENTING%20INSTRUCTIONS%203_3.pdf.
203. See id. at 9.
204. See generally PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION: WHAT FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE DOING (2010), available at
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of the Interior, for example, is in the early stages of identifying and
eventually opening eight regional Climate Science Centers (“CSCs”) and
partnering with other federal agencies, state entities, and interested
nongovernment stakeholders to create Landscape Conservation
Cooperatives (“LCCs”).205 LCC staff will “assist partners in integrating
status and trends data with effectiveness monitoring and applying science-
based monitoring programs to determine if resource goals are being met,
evaluate and adapt management goals and strategies, and work with CSC
staff to reduce key uncertainties and improve the next round of
forecasts.”206 This initiative is still in a very early stage,207 and, like many
other preceding regulatory initiatives, may simply call for the use of
adaptive regulatory approaches and inter-jurisdictional information sharing
without providing clear requirements, sufficient resources, or any other
incentives for continued and sustained monitoring, adaptive management,
and agency learning.208 Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see that the
planning stages call for extensive information gathering, partnerships
http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/FederalGovernmentLeadershiponAdaptation_Nov2010.p
df (describing briefly the many actions federal agencies are taking regarding climate adaptation).
Similarly, the Obama administration continues the recent trend of integrating adaptive
management in its most recent resource management initiatives. For example, in July 2010
President Obama signed an executive order adopting the final recommendations of the
Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force in their entirety. Council on Envtl. Quality, The
International Ocean Policy Task Force, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/oceans (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
They include both adaptive management and monitoring provisions, stating that “[h]uman
activities that may affect ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems should be managed using
ecosystem-based management and adaptive management, through an integrated framework that
accounts for the interdependence of the land, air, water, ice, and the interconnectedness between
human populations and these environments,” and that “[m]anagement should include monitoring
and have the flexibility to adapt to evolving knowledge and understanding, changes in the global
environment, and emerging uses.” THE WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, FINAL
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY OCEAN POLICY TASK FORCE 16 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/OPTF_FinalRecs.pdf.
205. Interior’s Plan for a Coordinated, Science-Based Response to Climate Change Impacts
on our Land, Water, and Wildlife Resources, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 1,
http://www.doi.gov/whatwedo/climate/strategy/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=2
3288 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Interior’s Plan]. For an example of such an LCC,
see generally California Landscape Conservation Cooperative, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(Dec. 2009), http://library.fws.gov/LCC/california.pdf.
206. Interior’s Plan, supra note 205, at 5.
207. Climate Science Centers, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/
whatwedo/climate/strategy/CSC-Map.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2011) (indicating that many of
the Climate Science Center sites have not been determined yet and that this process will continue
into the future).
208. See Camacho, supra note 24, at 47–48 (suggesting a range of tools for promoting agency
and stakeholder learning, including integration in manager performance evaluation and
compensation, financial or other regulatory inducements for regulated entities, and enlisting
stakeholders and outside agencies to buttress monitoring or evaluation).
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between government and nongovernment actors, and the distribution of
data that will enable stakeholders to adapt their natural resources
management decisions based on frequently updated information.
CONCLUSION
The existing governance system for managing natural resources in the
United States has only a limited capacity to cope with the effects of climate
change because of its reliance on static models of nature and decision
making. Existing natural resources management institutions are not well
suited to foster effective adaptation because they are unadaptive and
fragmented, and thus poorly designed to cultivate systematic learning and
manage uncertainty. This limitation is related to and exacerbated by a
heavy focus in many natural resources laws on managing resources toward
preserving historical conditions and minimizing human interaction with
ecological systems. The emphases on minimal management and historical
preservation will be increasingly misplaced, and in fact these two goals will
be more and more in direct tension with each other in light of modern
climate changes. Though these weaknesses of natural resources law existed
prior to the development of global anthropogenic climate change, its onset
makes these limitations particularly evident and the achievement of
conventional management goals increasingly untenable.
The historical preservationist and passive ends of natural resources
law, and the static means through which they are expected to be achieved,
all arise from the legal system’s discomfort with integrating and managing
uncertainty and change. They also depend on and reinforce each other.
Historical preservation’s static model of nature and the human-nature
dualism embedded in wilderness preservation help reinforce existing
regulatory fragmentation and natural resources law’s unadaptive model of
regulation. Reciprocally, historical preservation would not be possible
without wholesale landscape segmentation. Moreover, a reliance on a
historical ecological baseline, an emphasis on partitioning humans from
natural systems, and a lack of procedural flexibility in natural resources law
all encourage entrusting natural resource decision making to presumed
expert resource managers. This serves to limit public understanding of and
involvement in resource management decisions.
The solutions to the shortcomings of these two static visions are thus
linked. First, natural resources management must shift its ends toward
promoting an increased emphasis on limiting ecological shifts or
interactions that are likely to be detrimental to the ecological function and
biodiversity of ecological reserves given projected shifts in climatic
conditions, as well as seeking to foster those shifts likely to be beneficial.
Such a change would undoubtedly be fundamental, away from a simplistic
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static analysis of whether an ecological constituent preexisted European
settlement as the determining factor toward an evaluation of the ecological
and social significance of that constituent. This substantive vision of
natural resources management would still rely on substantial manager
expertise in determining ecological value, but places considerably greater
information-gathering pressure on already-isolated and information-
deprived natural resource managers.
As a result, fostering an effective shift in natural resource goals that
accommodates the transformative effects of climate change necessitates a
concomitant structural transformation in the natural resource decision-
making process. The means of natural resources law must be fundamentally
altered to better manage uncertainty and change, to inform and learn from
the public about the value of ecological resources, and to galvanize public
deliberation on natural resource decisions. This includes a regulatory
process premised on promoting stakeholder involvement, cultivating
agency and stakeholder learning, and reducing uncertainty over time.
Because the core normative analysis would necessarily be less expert-
driven, it would shift natural resource managers toward a more mediative
role.209
Such a learning infrastructure would not only serve to cultivate agency
accountability and learning. It would also help increase information to, and
facilitate transparent debate and deliberation among, stakeholders,
legislatures, and the public about the considerable value of ecological
systems, processes, and particular ecosystem constituents, as well as the
tradeoffs of different management strategies. Moreover, it would promote
opportunities for interjurisdictional information sharing while
accommodating the various diversity benefits of overlapping jurisdiction.
Finally, this infrastructure would help provide the framework for
establishing measurable goals and priorities for the active forward-looking
management of natural resources in a changing world. By transforming a
decidedly static governance system to be more dynamic and adaptive—
both in its goals and in how such goals are advanced—natural resources
law can make ecological systems more resilient and provide some hope that
these ecological communities on which humans are so dependent may be
able to sustain the effects of a rapidly changing climate.
209. See Camacho, supra note 28, at 352.
